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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation explores discourses about culture and illness in the talk of mental health 
professionals and indigenous healers. It represents an attempt to situate the issue of indigenous 
healing in South Africa within a particular strand of critical discourse analytic research. In the 
context of current deliberations on the value, or otherwise, of  indigenous healing in a changing 
health and specifically mental health system, the talk of both mental health practitioners and 
indigenous healers as they conceptualise “disorder”, and discuss possibilities for collaboration, 
is chosen as a specific focus for this study. Disputes over what constitutes “disorder” both 
within mental health, and between mental health and indigenous healing are an important site 
in which the negotiation of power relations between mental health professionals and 
indigenous healers is played out. 
 
The results of this study suggest that despite the construction of cogent commendations for the 
inclusion of indigenous healing in mental health, it remains largely marginalised within talk 
about mental health practice. While this study reproduces to some extent the marginalisation of 
indigenous healing discourse, it also examines some of the discursive practices and 
methodological difficulties implicated in its marginalisation. However, in the context of 
“cultural pride strategies” associated with talk about an African Renaissance, indigenous 
healing may also function as a site of assertion of African power and resistance in its 
construction as an essentially African enterprise. At the same time, it may achieve disciplinary 
effects consonant with cultural pride strategies, in constructing afflictions in terms of neglect 
of, or disloyalty to cultural tradition. These results are discussed in terms of the methodological 
difficulties associated with interviewing and discourse analysis of translated texts, which 
contributes to difficulties with articulating indigenous healing discourse in a way that 
challenges the dominant psychiatric discourses implicated in its marginalisation within mental 
health. It concludes with recommendations for future research which addresses indigenous 
healing discourse in its own terms, and examines its operation as a disciplinary apparatus in 
South African society. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND MENTAL HEALTH 
CARE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
Discourse perspectives that connect mental health practices with the cultural-political 
contexts that produce them are being increasingly employed by South African authors 
wishing to develop critical analyses and interventions (Levett, Kottler, Burman & 
Parker, 1997). Many of these analyses have drawn strongly from the work of Michel 
Foucault, in his analysis of modern culture. Employed within psychology, 
Foucauldian discourse analysis foregrounds the ways in which the production of 
knowledge within the discipline is the effect of power struggles over which versions 
of reality are to be sanctioned (Mills, 1997). 
 
Foucault’s theory of productive power, in which power is seen less as an oppressive 
or repressive force, but rather as operating through discourse to constitute and position 
people in various ways, is also especially relevant to the study of psychology and 
psychiatry. The “gaze” of these disciplines impels us to experience ourselves in 
certain ways as individual subjects and to assume certain “subject positions” (Parker, 
1992), in order to be accorded rights (whether as “users”, or as agents) to speak or 
participate in its institutions (Levett et al., 1997). 
 
The emergence of Foucauldian discourse analysis in the post-apartheid South African 
context is particularly timely, in that the approach provides a framework for 
examining the structuring effects of language as they are implicated in the continued 
operation of oppressive exclusionary practices, some of which were previously 
legislated in segregatory government policy. As Levett et al. (1997: 5) assert, “the 
pervasive notions of self, Other and legitimacy that saturate racist ideas and behaviour 
will long outlive the dismantling of apartheid”. In addition, although the major 
changes wrought by the onset of democracy have seen the unravelling of oppressive 
relations of power, they have also resulted in the production of new forms of 
discourse, whose potential to become inscribed in new regimes of truth requires a 
continued vigilance (Parker, 1992). 
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The mental health field is currently the site of a struggle for a “new discursive 
ordering” (Foster & S. Swartz 1997: 3). This struggle is reflected in the contrasting in 
much of the contemporary South African literature of terms such as “relational” and 
“holistic” with “individualist” and “mechanistic”, or “institutional” with “community-
based”. In introducing debates on changes in mental health policy, Foster and S. 
Swartz (1997) argue further that 
 
in South Africa one may characterise the form and content of mental 
health systems as a struggle between a dominant medical model on the 
one hand, and two alternative forms (i) Western psychological welfare and 
(ii) “alternative healing” on the other (p. 7). 
 
Foster and S. Swartz (1997) include two categories in “alternative healing”, those of 
African indigenous healing and “holistic” healing (e.g. aromatherapy, acupuncture, 
chiropractics, body therapies etc.), pointing out that consideration of “holistic” healing 
has been largely omitted from the national debate, whereas African indigenous 
healing is usually acknowledged as an important issue for discussion. In spite of its 
topicality, indigenous healing is described as an area in which serious debate is 
lacking. As will become apparent in the review of the literature, very little has been 
written about indigenous healing that addresses its position in relation to the 
dominance of the biomedical health system, while taking into account issues of power 
and control. In addition, even fewer studies have attended to the different ways in 
which notions of “culture” are used in accounts of indigenous healing.  
 
The continued social and economic inequalities between racialised groupings in South 
African society are obvious. With regards to mental health services, the inequalities 
that continue in spite of the racial integration of facilities and institutions have been 
more difficult to identify and document (cf. L. Swartz, 1996). The perpetuation of 
oppressive practices within mental health has been shown to be due in large part to the 
“racialisation” of madness within psychiatry (L. Swartz, 1989; 1991). Moreover, in 
addition to racialised inequities S. Swartz (1995) has shown that discrimination in 
psychiatric classification and treatment has also been both “classed” and “gendered”. 
 
A critical perspective on current developments in mental health may be gained from a 
brief consideration of its historical backdrop. Foster and S. Swartz (1997) describe the 
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development of mental health services in South Africa as it is intertwined with a 
history of colonialism. In their brief historical analysis, they outline the intersection of 
racist and biomedical discourse on madness in its positioning of Africans as “other”. 
These representations were part of psychiatric discourse well before the formal 
establishment of explicit apartheid policy. They argue that the increasing 
“humanisation” of psychiatric services over time was (and is) not only the result of 
greater attention to human rights and humane care, but also an extension of more 
subtle forms of psychological and medical power and surveillance. 
 
Against this background, this dissertation explores discourses about culture in the talk 
of mental health professionals and indigenous healers. It represents an attempt to 
situate the issue of indigenous healing in South Africa within a particular strand of 
critical discourse analytic research (Parker, 1992), in the hope that it will assist in 
reviving a hitherto stagnant debate. In the context of current deliberations on the 
value, or otherwise, of  indigenous healing in a changing health and specifically 
mental health system, the talk of both mental health practitioners and indigenous 
healers as they conceptualise “disorder”, and discuss possibilities for collaboration, is 
chosen as a specific focus for this study. Disputes over what constitutes “madness” 
within mental health will have major policy implications, and have hitherto been 
largely overlooked (Foster & S. Swartz, 1997). The conceptualisations of disorder of 
these particular traditions – specifically psychiatry, psychology, and indigenous 
healing – are particularly important in that they are central to the distribution of power 
between mental health professionals and indigenous healers, should they work 
together. 
 
The psychological and psychiatric disciplines both inform, and are informed by 
culture. However exact or formal practitioners may wish to be, they already employ 
culturally available discourses in their talk about patients and indigenous healers 
(Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin & Stowell-Smith, 1995). Contemporary local 
and continental debates about African identity and African culture are therefore 
particularly relevant to the issue of indigenous healing, and some attention is devoted 
to these debates in the present study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Representations of African indigenous healing and healers are intertwined with 
constructions of African culture and subjectivity. A review of the psychiatric and 
psychological literature concerning the subject of indigenous healing therefore 
necessarily entails an examination of the notion of “culture”. This will be crucial in 
providing a context within which the debate on indigenous healing may be understood. 
Other work concerning the construction of African subjectivity or “black minds” in 
psychology and psychiatry will also be considered. 
 
This will be followed by a review of the available literature concerned specifically with 
relevant policy debates, as well as studies or accounts of indigenous healing. Although 
predominantly a review of literature applicable to the Southern African context, it will 
also include reports on work done in other regions. 
 
 
2.2. “CULTURE” 
 
A criticism that has often been levelled at psychology and psychiatry is that it is “culture-
bound” and “culture-blind” (Lonner & Malpass, 1994). Certain authors have been quick 
to appropriate these criticisms for the South African context (e.g. Biesheuvel, 1987). 
However, this ignores the long history of writing on culture in South African psychology 
and psychiatry, which although ostensibly concerned with improving care, also clearly 
reproduced racist ideas (e.g. Laubscher, 1937, cited in L. Swartz, 1991). Importantly, 
ideas of culture and the “African mind” developed in such literature found their place in 
the rhetoric of the apartheid state in its justification of segregatory practices, and persist 
in psychological accounts written in the 1980s and up to the present. The mid-1980s and 
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early 1990s saw the proliferation of a body of literature that took up various critiques of 
mental health care in South Africa. Well-meaning mental health professionals concerned 
themselves with “cross-cultural” or “transcultural” work in efforts to address the 
inequalities of mental health provision, but in many cases succeeded only in reproducing 
racist or depoliticised analyses and solutions to the problem of “culturally appropriate” 
care. Such studies tended to presume the a priori existence of racial or cultural groups 
and differences (e.g. Van Schoor, 1989; Hickson, Christie & Shmukler, 1990). 
 
However, during this time there was another strand of writing which stimulated a 
renewed consideration of the social and cultural embeddedness of the mental health 
disciplines. For example, some writers criticised the “western”, individualist or 
“bourgeois” underpinnings of psychological theory and practice, and how such practices 
diverted attention and energy away from social or political action (Anonymous, 1986). 
Many liberal psychologists and academics strove to demonstrate mental health 
professionals’ (conscious or unconscious) collusion with, and participation in the 
prevailing social order, as well as the “cultural encapsulation” of psychological theory 
(Dawes, 1986; Turton, 1986). Significantly, certain authors working within a growing 
social constructionist movement argued that an examination of the notion of “culture” 
itself, as used in mental health literature, and by its practitioners, was integral to 
unpacking racist or discriminatory practice (L. Swartz, 1989, 1991; Kottler, 1990). 
 
 
2.2.1 The quandary of relativism vs. universalism 
 
In this section I will not rehearse the theoretical debates in anthropology or cultural 
psychology regarding relativism and universalism (cf. Shweder, 1990), but will focus 
instead on the dilemmas, particular to the South African context, associated with each 
position. “Culture” is a highly contested term and cannot be taken to be politically neutral 
(Foster & S. Swartz, 1997; L. Swartz, 1996). In much of the mental health literature it is 
used in ways that assume difference from the outset, and positions those to whom it refers 
as “other”. As Kottler (1990) has shown, discourses of cultural difference (associated 
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with a relativist position) or similarity (associated with a universalist position) as evident 
in various psychological accounts reproduce ideas that achieve or support differing 
political ends. Most prominently, the notion of an essential and natural cultural difference 
between “blacks” and “whites”1 provided justification for separate (and unequal) 
treatment in apartheid mental health care. Against this background, the particularly 
salient point made by both Kottler (1990) and L. Swartz (1996) was that to acknowledge 
or assert difference in the South African context was to somehow legitimate the existence 
of ethnicity and therefore to legitimate apartheid. As a consequence, many writers, 
adopting a universalist approach, would (and still continue to) downplay difference and 
emphasise the ways in which “we are all the same underneath”. The fact that a 
“differences” discourse is frequently regarded as politically progressive outside South 
Africa highlights an important dilemma in South African culture discourse (Kottler, 
1990). A notable exception was the work of writers such as Manganyi (1991, cited in L. 
Swartz, 1996), which emphasised the centrality of black experience and the positive 
assertion of black identity in providing possibilities for personal and political change. 
This work appeared during the late 1980s and early 1990s and is significant in that it was 
a time in which the political importance in South Africa of a universalist view (supportive 
of non-racialism) of culture was acute (Kottler, 1996). 
 
Situated within a broadly social constructionist framework, the work of Leslie Swartz 
(1989; 1991) was particularly important in demonstrating how “traditions of racism are 
woven into the fabric of care” (1991: 240), through the construction in the South African 
psychiatric literature (and reproduction in clinicians’ talk) of the “otherness” of Africans. 
It was particularly effective in highlighting the inherent contradictions within psychiatric 
practice that make it potentially discriminatory, and showing how even practitioners 
consciously opposed to discriminatory practice reproduced racism in their care of 
patients. L. Swartz (1991) demonstrated that the problems of a relativist position 
supportive of segregation could not be solved by a simple repudiation of relativism and a 
wholehearted embrace of universalism. Sensitive to the ways in which clinicians are torn 
                                                 
1
 It is recognised that these terms are constructions which derive from apartheid ideology, and are offensive. The irony 
inherent in much post-structuralist or discourse-analytic studies is that problematic or dualistic terms must often be 
invoked in order for them to be deconstructed (Parker, 1992). 
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by competing and conflicting discourses, L. Swartz (1991) has made the important point 
that despite the need for equal treatment of patients, it may at times be necessary to 
emphasise cultural difference in order to secure adequate and appropriate treatment. 
 
More recently, L. Swartz (1996) has noted that there is renewed appreciation in the social 
sciences for the study of cultural difference within a broadly non-racialist framework. 
However, his analysis of conditions in contemporary mental health care identifies some 
new problems foregrounded by the continuing “inclusivist” imperative in psychiatric 
care. He argues that the current emphasis on equal treatment has silenced or suppressed 
talk about difference, identity, or racism and even gone towards delegitimating patients’ 
and practitioners’ experiences of alienation (for an example of the ways in which 
“inclusivist” rhetoric may function in delegitimating accusations of racism, see Brown, 
1997). 
 
The demographics of professionals in the mental health field still largely reflects the 
distribution of power in the South African population. Psychiatrists and psychologists are 
still predominantly white, male and English-speaking (L. Swartz, 1998). Inasmuch as this 
is the case in most institutions, the removal of apartheid and integration of psychiatric 
care may not necessarily have resulted in better patient care. Ironically, patients may in 
fact be receiving care of worse quality from professionals who cannot speak their 
language than when previously confined to segregated wards (L. Swartz, 1998). 
Furthermore, the moral and political necessity to treat patients equally and to downplay 
differences presents many dilemmas for professionals attempting to address the problem 
of care for patients they continue to find difficult to understand (cf. L. Swartz, 1989). 
 
A more general trend in South African academia and in psychology in particular is the 
call for its “Africanisation” (Anonymous, 1986; Dawes, 1986; 1996; Mangcu, 1998). 
This is a complex debate which has important resonances with contemporary discourse 
around the emergence of an “African Renaissance” (e.g. speeches of President Thabo 
Mbeki, 1999). Arguments for greater understanding of “African epistemologies” as 
necessary for the relevance of psychology are commonly advanced. While it is 
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understood to be a laudable and worthwhile enterprise, Dawes (1998) points out that 
there is a danger of the concept of Africanisation being constructed in essentialist terms 
so that only “race” and culture are considered. There is the potential that talk about 
Africanisation will employ “. . . a rhetoric which binds the subjectivities of those 
inhabiting the African continent seamlessly together, denying that this is a constructive 
and historically informed exercise” (Dawes, 1998: 6). Thus, Dawes (1998) argues that 
while the traditional dichotomy that structures the debate (that between African and 
“western”) is useful and understandably salient in light of our history of colonial 
oppression, it might also be useful to consider differences between what he calls 
“modern” and “modernising” societies. These alternative terms are not unproblematic (cf. 
Mills, 1997), but in effect, Dawes’ (1998) suggestion is an attempt to de-centre the 
tendency to think of Africanisation as an issue only of race or culture. However, in 
contrast to Dawes, Appiah (1995) has argued that the assertion of an African identity is 
important in the forming of, for example, Pan-African alliances, and that despite the 
recognition that identities are historically constructed, their effectiveness relies on their 
being seen as natural and real. 
 
 
2.3. CONSTRUCTIONS OF “AFRICAN MINDS” 
 
In his review of the South African transcultural psychiatric literature published up to the 
late 1980’s, L. Swartz (1989: 16) identified three “contexts for interpreting mental health 
and illness”, which are useful for the present review, and still prevalent in the current 
literature. The first explains manifestations of distress and healing in terms of inherent 
characteristics particular to different South Africans, which make use of concepts such as 
the “African personality”, world-view, or attitudes. The second seeks to relate 
phenomena to their broader social context, and the third employs psychological theory in 
understanding illness and healing. These contexts will be recalled later in the review of 
the literature concerned specifically with indigenous healing. In this section I would like 
to pay special attention to the notion of an “African personality”. In the following 
paragraphs I will seek to draw out both the major methodological problems with concepts 
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of the “African personality” or world-view, and provide a summary of the ways in which 
these have been characterised in the literature. 
 
Concepts of the African “personality” or world-view are problematic for a number of 
reasons. They have usually been used to assert essential differences between Africans and 
“whites”, most commonly representing African people as “in harmony with nature” and 
“collectivist”, and in condemning the detrimental effects of “western” culture on the 
African personality (Bodibe & Sodi, 1997: 187-188). L. Swartz (1989) identifies another 
common feature of the “African personality” concept in the work of Hammond-Tooke 
(1975, cited in Swartz, 1989) – the view that Africans are concerned more with “WHY 
rather than HOW misfortunes occur”. This has great relevance to discussions around 
indigenous healing, as healers are often portrayed as providing the causal (implied 
spiritual) narratives most preferred by (or comforting to) Africans, in contrast to the 
(rational) diagnoses of “western” mental health (e.g. Gillis, Koch & Joyi, 1989). 
 
In addition, making use of theoretical notions of “locus of control”, Africans are often 
labelled pejoratively as lacking “inner-directedness” and unable or unwilling to 
acknowledge responsibility for misfortune, attributing it to external agents or causes (e.g. 
Herbst & Britz, 1986). This deficiency is deemed the cause of “psychic turmoil, which 
expresses itself in an increasing incidence of psychiatric problems of a psychosomatic 
nature, as well as anxiety, depression and alcoholic problems” (Henning, 1982, quoted in 
L. Swartz, 1987: 26). In earlier literature this concept has been employed in arguments 
that Africans are inherently ill-suited to (or uninterested in) individualistic achievement 
and intellectual pursuit (L. Swartz, 1989). 
 
In summary, constructions of “African personalities” often portray the realm of the 
intellect as being essentially unavailable or unimportant to Africans. These 
representations contribute to evolutionist discourse about the slower progression of 
Africans from traditional (irrational) belief in witchcraft and the supernatural to the 
modern (rational) empiricist consideration of life, as compared to Europeans. 
Importantly, L. Swartz (1989: 21) highlights a lack of attention to the possibility that 
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“traditional African” concepts of health and illness, rather than being evidence of 
“evolutionary backwardness”, represent part of a “national pride strategy”, in support of a 
Black Consciousness ideology. 
 
Thus, although a potentially discriminatory concept, the “African personality” has also 
been employed by authors associated with Black Consciousness movements attempting 
to encourage a positive black identity (e.g. Manganyi, 1991, cited in L. Swartz, 1996) and 
those (more contemporary) authors bemoaning a loss (or lack) of respect for African 
culture (e.g. Bodibe & Sodi, 1997).  
 
 
2.4. INDIGENOUS HEALING IN THE MENTAL HEALTH LITERATURE 
 
2.4.1. Introduction 
 
It is curious that while the imperative for collaboration between healers and the formal 
(mental) health sector has been repeatedly emphasised over the last twenty years, there is 
little formal collaboration at present, at least in South Africa. The situation is different in 
several other African countries, in which a number of collaborative programmes are 
underway, particularly in the field of HIV and AIDS prevention (Green, 1994). Of equal 
importance is the apparent stalemate in the discourse on indigenous healing in the South 
African literature. Although most articles are overwhelmingly positive about indigenous 
healing, they tend to be written as if this attitude was not the general view (e.g. Hopa, 
Simbayi & Du Toit, 1998). In addition, the absence of critical analysis of indigenous 
healing in the literature contributes to the continued portrayal of indigenous healing 
practices as mysterious and incomprehensible to outsiders (e.g. Bodibe & Sodi, 1997), 
and of indigenous healing as an exclusively “black” enterprise (L. Swartz, 1996). L. 
Swartz (1996) argues that, taken together, these two points suggest that indigenous 
healing currently functions as a site of resistance for black authors and the positive 
assertion of African identity. 
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In the following section, the literature dealing with various aspects of indigenous healing 
and collaboration will be reviewed, beginning first with broader policy debates, and then 
leading onto studies or accounts of indigenous healing. 
 
It is necessary to clarify a number of terms. African indigenous healing is by no means a 
singular phenomenon, although it is often referred to as such. It is characteristically 
heterogeneous, and comprises a wide and pluralistic range of practitioners and practices 
(Kleinman, 1988a). Green (1994) nevertheless asserts that in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
most common distinction made is that between herbalists (amaxhwele in Xhosa) and 
diviner-mediums (amagqirha in Xhosa). Typically, herbalists tend to work with the 
physical material of medicinal plants, while diviners have (additionally) special access to 
ancestral and other spirits believed to authorise and assist in healing and divination. It is 
the diviner who is most commonly referred to in the psychological literature on 
indigenous healing in South Africa, since s/he specialises in oracular and ceremonial 
practices, which are sometimes regarded as forms of psychological or group/social 
therapy (Hirst, 1993; Green, 1994). Diviners (as opposed to herbalists), it is assumed, are 
preferred by people experiencing what may be simplistically termed “psychological” 
distress. This division of the treatment provided by diviners and herbalists into 
“psychological”, versus physical care is predicated upon the problematic Cartesian mind-
body dualism that plagues much of psychological theory and the mental health literature, 
and which, it is often argued, is a mode of explanation and experience foreign to African 
culture (Hirst et al., 1996). 
 
 
2.4.2. Broad policy issues 
 
The promotion of indigenous healing and collaboration with the (mental) health system is 
motivated not only by goodwill toward healers and concern for the well-being of patients. 
There is a diversity of parties and interests that may lie behind efforts to collaborate. For 
example, co-operation may be motivated by such things as political pressure, social-
scientific interest, pragmatic or humanitarian reasons, financial gain, anti-medical 
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sentiments, or political resistance (Last, 1986, cited in Green, 1994). Korber (1990) has 
correctly pointed out that the important factors at stake in the South African debate 
concern the power struggle between systems regarding access to patients and resources, 
as well as professional controls. Those who promote the legitimacy of healers may be 
seeking legitimacy themselves, and it is worthwhile to examine what each party involved 
in the debate on indigenous healers stands to gain or lose (Fassin & Fassin, 1988, cited in 
Green, 1994). 
 
Descriptions of, or suggestions for, the nature of the collaboration practitioners are 
exhorted to engage in are surprisingly rare in the South African literature. Matters 
concerning where, or in what setting, collaboration or integration should take place (e.g. 
on hospital grounds, in ward rounds, as part of a multidisciplinary team, in the healer’s 
sacred hut) are seldom discussed. This absence is notable precisely because such issues 
concern power relationships between the practitioners. 
 
Various authors have tried to address some of the complexities of defining an appropriate 
working relationship between indigenous healers and mental health (Green, 1994; Hopa 
et al., 1998; Kleinman, 1988; Korber, 1990; Kottler, 1988; L. Swartz, 1989). Most 
distinguish between two approaches, those of “integration” and “collaboration”. As 
Green (1994: 20) argues, albeit from an AIDS prevention and management perspective, 
“integration” implies, and would entail, “fundamental alteration in both healing systems 
and in the roles of the respective practitioners, although in practice it is the traditional 
healer who is expected to change”. Green (1994: 20) warns against the extraction of the 
indigenous healer from his/her social and spiritual functions in the community and his/her 
subsequent insertion into the medical hierarchy as a “second-rate paramedical worker”, 
arguing that this might disrupt, among other things, a community’s capacity to attend to 
and solve it’s own social and health problems. 
 
Similarly, some authors have voiced concern over the possibility that proposals for 
integrating healers into the health system, for example, in the Department of Health’s 
White Paper on the transformation of the health system (Department of Health, 1997) 
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may represent attempts to incorporate and control indigenous healers within the existing 
biomedical health system (Korber, 1990; Van Damme & Maseko, 1997). Kottler (1988) 
has made the important observation that calls for the professionalisation of indigenous 
healers have come largely from the “dominant elite” (those within mental health and 
biomedicine), rather than from healers themselves. She argues that such calls have behind 
them images of indigenous healing as “polluted” and “dirty” (Douglas, 1966, cited in 
Kottler, 1988). Therefore, proposals that healers professionalise and become subject to 
the controls of professional bodies, such as the Health Professions Council, or an 
independent body within indigenous healing, may also reflect attempts by practitioners to 
change indigenous healing into a less threatening or harmful practice (Kottler, 1988; 
Kleinman, 1988a). However, professionalised indigenous healers would pose an 
economic threat to the medical profession, since healers would then receive a portion of 
already scarce state resources (Korber, 1990; Green, 1994). 
 
Chavunduka (1986, cited in Kottler, 1988: 13) regards professionalisation as an important 
move for “tactical” reasons rather than “pragmatic” ones (e.g. improving their training), 
since it would “prevent political impotence in the face of the powerful medical system”. 
But since healers are usually consulted according to their reputation, it is likely that it is 
the self-proclaimed healers who stand to benefit most from professionalisation. 
 
Van Damme and Maseko (1997) of the Traditional Healing Organisation of Africa 
suggest that a separate and autonomous Indigenous Health Department be created that 
could “co-ordinate all future inter health (sic) systems co-operation from an early stage, 
... have executive powers and a formal role in national health care management and 
policy making”. However, certain authors, both within and outside of indigenous healing 
point out that the bureaucratisation of a heterogeneous and pluralistic indigenous healing 
system would involve fundamental changes to indigenous healing itself (cf. Kottler, 
1988; Green, 1994). The simultaneous need to secure governmental power, resources and 
sanction through the creation of bureaucratic structures, while maintaining the 
distinctiveness and autonomy of indigenous healing represents an important dilemma in 
the debate on whether healers should professionalise. 
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The situation is further complicated by the absence of any unitary representative body for 
indigenous healers with which the government may consult (Kottler, 1988; Korber, 
1990). Relatively recently, however, requirements by local government health 
departments (for example, in the Northern Province) to negotiate with only one 
representative structure for healers resulted in the merging of eleven different 
associations into a single association (Bodibe & Sodi, 1997). 
 
Other recent developments in government have seen parliamentary proposals for the 
formation of a statutory council that will manage the registration of all qualifying 
traditional healers and promote training, research, and the creation of a traditional 
medicine database. Its task will be to develop a code of conduct and maintain discipline 
in the profession, while facilitating co-operation among traditional healers, the medical 
profession, and the government (Baleta, 1998; Hess, 1998). Additionally, these proposals 
include suggestions for the formal division of indigenous healers into four categories: the 
inyanga (traditional doctors or herbalists), the sangoma  (diviner), birth attendants or 
midwives, and traditional surgeons who mainly do circumcisions. Interestingly, spiritual 
healers were not included because their training and accreditation was "unclear" and "ill-
defined" (Baleta, 1998: 554). 
 
 “Collaboration” on the other hand, implies a working relationship between somewhat 
equal partners, the form of which would require additional fleshing out. Green (1994) 
suggests a kind of collaboration in which appropriate referrals are made between healers 
and their mental health counterparts, and there is a mutual exchange of certain skills and 
knowledge. Many who advocate this approach also suggest that it would be preferable for 
each system to practise within its own framework, and for patients to have access to both 
(Korber, 1990). Such suggestions are usually supported by arguments that emphasise 
(irreconcilable) differences between indigenous healing and biomedicine or mental health 
(Korber, 1990; Kottler, 1988). Whether this is indeed the case or not, as L. Swartz (1996) 
has observed, such a view contributes to justifying a continued lack of understanding of 
indigenous healing by its mental health counterparts. 
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The circumstances in other southern African countries may be informative and certain 
South African authors have tried to draw insights from them (e.g. Freeman, 1988). 
Korber (1990) reports that in Zimbabwe indigenous healers were legalised in 1981 and 
organised into the Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association (ZINATHA). By 
1990 it had established two medical schools and four clinics. Healers are instructed to 
seek second opinions, and to refer patients to hospitals for certain conditions. In 
Zimbabwe it has been widely speculated that “neurotic” problems can be treated by 
healers, whereas “psychotic” problems should be left to the care of “advanced western 
medicine” (Freeman, 1988). 
 
In Ghana and Zambia healers receive governmental assistance, and are usually the first 
line of contact for patients. Twumasi and Warren (1986, cited in Korber, 1990) argue that 
in these countries indigenous healers have been influenced by “western” medicine and 
are increasingly regarded as an acceptable occupational group. Ghanaian and Zambian 
doctors regard them as collaborators in contributing to efforts to provide a national health 
service (Korber, 1990). In the above cases it appears that successful co-operation has 
taken place only with changes to indigenous healing practice in the form of medical 
training, and its institutionalisation. 
 
Green (1994: 26) describes what he terms “cultural distance” between indigenous healers 
and “medically educated Africans and their expatriate advisers” as a factor constraining 
collaborative programs2. Some African government officials may feel that indigenous 
healers may project images of backwardness, of the primitive, and even of the illegal, and 
regard healers as a “somewhat embarrassing anachronism”, particularly when dealing 
with foreign or outside donors (Green, 1994: 30; cf. Bodibe & Sodi, 1997). As a result, 
Green (1994) argues, governments may oppose official recognition for indigenous 
healers. 
 
                                                 
2 Notions of “cultural distance” between Africans (rather than between Africans and Europeans) are rare in the South 
African literature. Green’s (1994) point highlights the persistence of apartheid ideology in the tendency for cultural 
difference (particularly in the debate on indigenous healing in South Africa) to be cast in racial terms. 
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2.4.3. The case for collaboration 
 
Most of the literature is uncritically positive about the need for some form of 
collaboration between indigenous healing and mental health (Ensink & Robertson, 1999, 
are a notable exception). Proponents of collaboration with indigenous healers in the 
psychological and psychiatric literature appear to employ three broad lines of argument in 
their rationales for collaboration. These arguments reflect assumptions that affect the 
ways in which indigenous healing is framed in the various papers and research studies 
reviewed here. 
 
The first builds a case for collaboration by highlighting statistics, such as the results of 
Department of Health surveys that suggest that a large proportion (up to 80%) of the 
population already makes frequent use of indigenous healing (Bodibe & Sodi, 1997), 
simultaneously with biomedicine, and move between them in ways that do not follow 
evolutionist predictions, i.e. that the more urbanised Africans become, the more they will 
make use of biomedicine, leaving behind indigenous healing (Bodibe & Sodi, 1997; 
Ensink & Robertson, 1999; Hopa et al., 1998). As Ensink and Robertson (1999) point out 
in relation to psychiatric patients, and Green (1994) argues with regard to AIDS and 
sexually transmitted diseases, whether indigenous healers are acknowledged by 
biomedicine or not, in reality they are widely consulted, often in conjunction with, or in 
preference to, doctors and mental health professionals. As estimated by the Department 
of Health in 1997, indigenous healers have numerical superiority over their medical 
counterparts. There are approximately 350 000 healers in comparison with 300 000 
medical personnel in South Africa (Bodibe & Sodi, 1997). These statistics do not, 
however, reflect the heterogeneity of indigenous healing; it is not specified what 
proportions of these healers are made up of diviners, herbalists or faith healers etc. As a 
result, a number of authors have commented on the benefits that a sharing of medical 
knowledge with indigenous healers may have for addressing national health problems 
such as AIDS. However, these same authors are also quick to point out the danger in such 
proposals of healers being co-opted into the medical system as lower-status health 
workers (Green, 1994; Hirst, 1993; Korber, 1990). Foster and S. Swartz (1997) make the 
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important point that simple piecemeal insertion of indigenous forms of healing into 
existing biomedical structures tends to undermine their power as distinct explanatory and 
healing models. 
 
Second, with the current emphasis in the national health strategy on primary health care 
(Department of Health, 1997), and in light of the shortage of medical and psychiatric 
personnel in rural areas and in what is often referred to as the “community”, indigenous 
healers are seen as readily available and accessible complementary practitioners who can 
provide care for people before they come to occupy valuable hospital beds and use 
expensive resources (Coughlan, 1995). Green (1994: 19) asserts that in most of Africa, 
traditional healers 
 
are the acknowledged de facto primary health care providers in rural areas, 
and this is not only by default. High concentrations of healers in periurban 
areas suggests that they are still frequently consulted even when hospitals and 
clinics are available. 
 
 
Third, indigenous healers are argued to provide more culturally appropriate and “holistic” 
care for some African patients where “western” practitioners fail (Bodibe & Sodi, 1997; 
Green, 1994; Hopa et al., 1998). In addition, healers are depicted as enjoying greater 
prestige and credibility in health and spiritual matters (Green, 1994; Herbst & Britz, 
1986). Admonitory calls feature in a large proportion of the indigenous healing literature, 
in which “western” (sometimes implied “white”) mental health practitioners are 
constructed as wholly different and “culturally encapsulated”, and therefore unable to 
understand either indigenous healing or African people in general (Bodibe & Sodi, 1997). 
The assertion that indigenous healing is especially effective with African patients is very 
often made without adequate empirical evidence, and is usually accepted at face value 
because of its resonance with dominant discourses that idealise African culture (cf. L. 
Swartz, 1996). As mentioned above, these arguments construct indigenous healing as 
something exclusively for Africans, and neglect the published literature on the problems 
of witchcraft (e.g. Evans & Singh, 1991), or the potentially harmful effects of some of its 
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methods (Dickinson, 1998). Moreover, indigenous healers are commonly represented as 
being automatically able to understand African patients by virtue of the fact that they are 
also African, and are thus better suited for their care. In parallel with the debate on 
Africanisation, such an approach (which focuses predominantly on “culture”) tends to 
ignore other important factors which may lie behind people’s use of indigenous healing, 
such as the inaccessibility or inadequacy of existing medical or mental health care 
(Korber, 1990; Green, 1994). 
 
An important study by Ensink and Robertson (1999), although limited since it is only 
applicable to the experiences of psychiatric patients, provides an interesting counter to 
wholehearted proposals for collaboration. In a comparative study of patient and family 
satisfaction with psychiatric services and indigenous healers, Ensink and Robertson 
(1999) found that while patients were satisfied with their encounters with herbalists and 
faith healers, they reported negative experiences with diviners. Moreover, they found that 
patients’ use of “indigenous names” as explanatory categories for the distress did not 
preclude their being satisfied with psychiatric services. They recommend “further direct 
study of indigenous healing practices for individuals with mental illness” (Ensink & 
Robertson, 1999: 40). As will be discussed further in the following section on research 
into indigenous healing, such “direct” studies are rare. 
 
 
2.4.4. Studies of indigenous healing and collaboration 
 
The following is a review of studies or accounts of indigenous healing practice, and in 
certain cases, instances of collaboration with mental health, found in the 
psychological/psychiatric literature. To begin with, it is interesting to note here that no 
research with the explicit aim of determining the efficacy (or otherwise) of indigenous 
healing was found in the literature (except perhaps for Edwards, 1986). As L. Swartz 
(1996) has commented, much of the literature on indigenous healing contains 
descriptions, rather than analyses of, indigenous healing processes. It seems clear that 
conventional outcome-based designs applied to studies of psychotherapy (as have been 
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suggested by some) might not be wholly appropriate when studying indigenous healing 
(cf. Korber, 1990). However, despite the fact that such studies would present complex 
methodological challenges, their absence is conspicuous. L. Swartz (1996) has argued 
that this has much to do with the construction of indigenous healing as unknowable to 
outsiders, and a regard for attempts to examine it as evidence of disrespect for African 
culture (e.g. Hopa et al., 1998). 
 
As mentioned earlier, it would be useful here to recall the three “contexts for interpreting 
mental health and illness” identified in the literature by L. Swartz (1989), since it is 
possible to categorise the literature on indigenous healing in a similar way. It would 
however be an error to think of these as mutually exclusive “contexts”. For example, 
many accounts that interpret indigenous healing in terms of its social context may also 
employ notions of the “African personality”. 
 
 
The African world-view/personality  
 
Most psychological/psychiatric accounts of indigenous healing that employ the concept 
of the African personality or world-view follow a somewhat similar format. Studies by 
Herbst and Britz (1986) of collaboration with healers in an “industrial” setting, and of 
Wittstock, Rozental and Henn (1991) at a primary school, are illustrative. Both reports 
begin with a rationale for consulting with healers, which often includes some notion of 
“cultural” appropriateness, as mentioned above. This is followed by an “authoritative 
overview” or description of African culture and the role played by the indigenous healer 
in it, usually without any reference to research. In these accounts, African culture is 
assumed to be static and homogeneous, and Africans are positioned as passively subject 
to its prescriptions. Neither of these studies attempts to analyse the consultation process, 
although Herbst and Britz (1986) provide a lengthy and detailed description of the 
proceedings. 
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An interesting feature of the above studies is that in both cases the mental health 
professionals allowed the healers to operate independently. Wittstock et al. (1991: 852) 
even go as far as to state that “the healers’ power and status in the community would be 
undermined if they were perceived as part of the [mental health] team”. Herbst and Britz 
(1986: 7) report the decision to call in indigenous healers as a “drastic step” and a “last 
resort”, while Wittstock et al. (1991: 852) considered it a necessary step when “western 
beliefs and interpretations did not seem adequate”. In both reports, the need for 
indigenous healers is framed as a solution to a problem of a situation resistant to 
interrogation by “normal” means. In these accounts, indigenous healers are seen to 
provide interventions that cater to the superstitious and irrational African mind, which 
cannot be reached by “western” reasoning. 
 
In a chapter ostensibly addressing policy issues, Bodibe and Sodi (1997) provide a 
largely polemical “overview” of indigenous healing that mystifies the work and 
effectiveness of indigenous healers. Far from taking policy debates forward, Bodibe and 
Sodi (1997) take great pains to spell out the uniqueness and value of the African world-
view, and to stress the difference between “contemporary Anglo-American values” and 
“traditional African values”. A number of “uniquely African” problems are described, 
which therefore require for their resolution “techniques that are uniquely and pertinently 
African” (Bodibe & Sodi, 1997: 186). Propitiation ceremonies conducted to appease 
ancestors and circumcision rites are proffered as the correct solutions, effectively ruling 
out “western” practitioners from offering any useful interventions. Healers in this account 
are cast as naturally closer to patients, while “western” practitioners are depicted as 
ignorant and foolishly cynical.  
 
The solution to this lack of cultural knowledge, as recommended by both Bodibe and 
Sodi (1997) and Hopa et al. (1998: 13), is to “reduce the ignorance, prejudice and 
suspicion among western and traditional practitioners about their counterparts . . . 
[through] . . . joint workshops, seminars and/or conferences . . . to encourage the 
practitioners to learn about each other”. It is implied then that collaboration would 
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automatically and unproblematically begin to occur if only “we would learn about each 
other’s cultures”. 
 
Research studies done in other contexts make use of similar notions of culture and are 
illustrative. Suryani and Jensen (1992) describe efforts at collaboration between 
psychiatrists and traditional healers in the management of an episode of “mass 
dissociative disorder” in Bali. Similarly to writers in the South African context, their 
description of Balinese culture is framed in largely essentialist terms, including relevant 
aspects of Balinese beliefs and help-seeking habits. The validity of this exposition of 
Balinese culture (which is then used to make sense of the interventions described later) is 
unquestioned, presumably because one of the authors of the report appears to be 
Balinese. 
 
It is particularly relevant that the authors describe this as a “rural” consultation, and an 
intervention at “community-level”, which seems to necessitate a discussion about issues 
of definition and open consultation with the “community”, that would likely not have 
been raised in the clinical/hospital setting. In the hospital setting, the organisation of 
space underlines the power of psychiatry to define patients’ identities, for example, in 
locked wards (cf. Rose, 1994). The issue of whether a diagnostic name will be upsetting 
to a patient is less likely to be considered, and the name is not necessarily given to a 
patient. It seems that working outside of this setting occasioned greater attention to issues 
of power, community suspicion, and lay-professional relations than might have been the 
case in the hospital with an individual. The authors nevertheless reserve the right to 
define the situation, which they do in psychiatric terms. Interestingly, they conclude by 
recommending less direct contact between mental health professionals and indigenous 
healers, in order to minimise conflict over treatment, and avoid attempts to change each 
other’s practices.  
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The social context  
 
There are relatively few accounts in the psychological and psychiatric literature that seek 
to understand indigenous healing within its social and cultural context. The work of 
Harriet Ngubane (1977) and Manton Hirst (1990; 1993) are significant exceptions, 
although both are anthropologists and not directly involved in mental health care. Hirst 
(1993) conducted an ethnographic study of the Xhosa amagqirha (diviners), undergoing 
the training himself. Despite its extravagant claim that “divination is an indigenous form 
of Freudian psychoanalysis” (1993: 97), Hirst’s study provides some access to 
understanding indigenous healing symbols and practice on its own terms. It shows due 
respect for the process by which healers are called by the ancestors, but also allows for 
explanations that account for social and economic reasons behind initiation into 
indigenous healing. For example, Hirst (1993) describes how becoming a diviner could 
be a culturally available means of redressing serious interpersonal difficulties in the 
family, as well as an entrepreneurial means of earning money outside of formal, low-
paying employment. Hirst’s (1993) work is significant in that it enhances the credibility 
of indigenous healing by translating its key concepts and symbols into formal academic, 
anthropological language, without compromising its complexity. Although in the final 
analysis Hirst (1993) asserts the essential similarity between (western) psychoanalysis 
and divining, his detailed ethnographic accounts prevent the crude collapsing of 
indigenous healing practices into psychological concepts. Additionally, the detail of 
Hirst’s (1990; 1993) and Ngubane’s (1977) works on indigenous healing helps to avert 
the tendency in South African psychiatry to focus on the peculiar and exotic (L. Swartz, 
1986). 
 
In one of the few reports of collaboration between indigenous healing and psychiatry, 
Hirst, Cook and Kahn (1996) apply anthropological and psychological concepts to 
indigenous healing (in this case the Xhosa amagqirha or diviners), situating it within a 
socio-cultural context, and elaborating meanings around Xhosa symbols and practices, 
paying special attention to the issue of social relations and somatisation (a psychoanalytic 
notion). These authors base their arguments on the thesis that with the “Cape Nguni”, the 
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human body is symbolic of the social body, and therefore “illness and disorder are 
interpreted among the Cape Nguni as being caused by unresolved conflicts in significant 
social relationships with kith and kin” (Hirst et al., 1996: 256). They analyse several case 
studies in this context, broadening interpretations of predominantly somatic symptoms –  
the somatic mode, they argue, is a common way in which Xhosa-speaking people 
communicate distress – to acknowledge them as expressive of emotional and particularly 
social distress.  
 
Their analysis of the case of Ms G is particularly pertinent to the present research in that 
it is an account of the ways in which both the healers and the psychiatric team 
conceptualised and made sense of Ms G and her difficulties. As the psychiatric team 
deliberated over a diagnosis of psychotic illness, diviners were invited to consult with Ms 
G. Hirst et al. (1996) contrast the narrow, “meaningless” interpretation of Ms G’s 
symptoms as signs of psychiatric illness, with the socially contextualised interpretation 
offered by the diviners, who explained that Ms G was being tormented by evil spirits 
(amafufunyana) related to her husband’s unfaithfulness, and her failure (due to her 
Christian beliefs) to perform the requisite traditional rituals connected with her marriage 
and the birth of her children. Hirst et al. (1996) attempt to conceptualise this aetiology of 
Ms G’s symptoms, which comprised religious or spiritual and somatic elements, in terms 
of the stresses of social and cultural change. 
 
Significantly, although their concluding plea that “shades” and somatisation be 
recognised simply as cultural modes for the expression of social conflict represents an 
important counter to the medicalisation of these expressions, this assertion highlights the 
complexities of accounting for indigenous healing concepts within psychological or 
anthropological discourse, particularly when produced for a professional or academic 
audience. While this account may render indigenous healing concepts accessible to a 
wider audience, there is also the potential for them to oversimplify these concepts, and 
therefore trivialise the work of indigenous healers. Hence, the above assertion that shades 
are “simply” expressive of social conflict may ironically reproduce the marginalisation of 
indigenous healing. 
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Psychological theory  
 
There are only a few instances in which authors have applied psychological theory to the 
task of understanding indigenous healing. Schweitzer (1977) has used phenomenological 
theory in his account of Xhosa “categories of experience”. He makes many comparisons 
with “western” forms of healing and experience. Burhmann (1984) is well known for her 
Jungian approach to indigenous healing rituals and symbols, comparing for example, the 
ukuthwasa initiatory “illness” through which healers are called, to Jung’s theory of 
individuation. 
 
 
Comparative studies of indigenous healing  
 
A number of studies may be found in the South African psychiatric/psychological 
literature that examine African concepts and idioms of distress or illness. Many of these 
studies also attempt to evaluate the equivalence of these terms with DSM-IV psychiatric 
categories and what are termed “culture-bound syndromes” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). The social construction of these categories is to varying extents, 
acknowledged or ignored by these studies. Most however, reify both the psychiatric 
categories and African idioms or concepts of distress they attempt to understand and 
compare (cf. Kleinman, 1988). 
 
Peltzer (1998: 191) has documented the social demographics, concepts of illness, “case 
load”, and training and specialisation of indigenous healers in the Northern Province, in a 
largely positivist and biomedically biased account. Thorpe (1982) has studied 
“psychodiagnostics” in Zionist faith healing. Although he has employed a qualitative 
methodology, the research is based on universalist assumptions and collapses indigenous 
idioms and explanatory concepts into psychiatric categories. Mkize’s (1998) review of 
the literature on amafufunyana concludes similarly. Mogale (1999) has argued that the 
Tswana idiom of distress “moriti wa letswele” (literally, “shadow of the breast”) is 
culturally specific, but in an attempt to integrate “western psychology and the original 
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experiential world of black patients”, Mogale (1999: 73) has equated it with the DSM-IV 
category of somatoform pain disorder. The value of these accounts in dispelling 
ignorance by bringing African terms and concepts into the formal academic arena is 
debatable. It may be argued that their construction of these idioms of distress as real and 
invariant objects in effect amounts only to their appropriation into a more “culturally 
sensitive” biomedical discourse. 
 
Ensink and Robertson (1996) document descriptions by indigenous healers of 
“indigenous categories of distress”, such as amafufunyana, ukuthwasa and isimnyama 
esikolweni (thought to be equivalent to brain fag syndrome), to determine whether it 
would be possible to include them in epidemiological studies. They conclude that 
although the “categories” studied correspond with aspects of certain DSM-IV psychiatric 
categories, they are insufficiently clearly defined and are used variously to denote a 
variety of afflictions or difficulties. In addition, they note that symptoms are neither 
prioritised nor tightly enough circumscribed in these “categories”.  
 
Importantly, when comparing the ways in which healers in their study made use of 
idioms of illness with those of patients and their families (cf. Lund, 1994, cited in Ensink 
& Robertson, 1996; Lund & L. Swartz, 1998), they point out that these categories were 
employed by healers as relatively discrete, producing accounts that “accentuate 
ethnospecific features” (Ensink & Robertson, 1996: 162). This finding suggests that the 
terms or idioms used by indigenous healers are by no means authoritative and cannot be 
considered to be representative of the experiences or understandings of all Africans. It 
also highlights the role that healers, and not only medical professionals play in 
reproducing discourses about illness and social norms. 
 
While contributing to an understanding of Xhosa idioms of distress, Ensink and 
Robertson (1996) acknowledge that studies such as theirs, which construct categorical 
representations of distress, may contribute to indiscriminate application of these 
categories in the name of cultural sensitivity. Significantly, they are not unequivocally 
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positive about indigenous healing, which they argue, may also be unhelpful in attributing 
causes of distress to bewitchment, for example. 
 
Understanding the nature of what is known as amafufunyana, has been the subject of 
many psychological and psychiatric studies. It has been compared with the DSM-IV’s 
brief psychotic disorder (Mkize, 1998), and also understood as a form of hysteria or 
dissociative disorder (Guiness, 1992, cited in Ensink & Robertson, 1996). Lund and L. 
Swartz (1998) investigated the experiences of Xhosa-speaking schizophrenic patients, 
and concluded that the term amafufunyana is used in complex ways as a diagnostic, 
explanatory and aetiological concept. Arguing from a social constructionist perspective, 
they assert that questions of which “diagnosis”, whether amafufunyana or psychosis, is 
correct, are irrelevant, since patients employ both terms in understanding their condition. 
Similarly, consultation with indigenous healers to determine whether something is 
“cultural” as opposed to “psychiatric”, a common way in which the debate is structured, 
would fall into the same trap of reification. 
 
Ensink and Robertson (1999) conducted a comparative investigation of psychiatric 
patients’ (and their families’) experiences of psychiatric services and indigenous healers 
in Cape Town. Importantly, this study is one of the few that attempts to address the issue 
of improving communication by demystifying indigenous concepts of illness. The 
authors also take a more critical approach towards indigenous healing, and warn against 
naï ve endorsement of its practices. Its significant findings were twofold. First, Ensink and 
Robertson found that patients reported being satisfied with herbalists and faith healers, 
while having predominantly negative experiences with diviners, who had promised, but 
were unable to produce, the results patients had paid substantial amounts of money for. 
Second, as I have previously mentioned, patients expressed less dissatisfaction with 
psychiatric services than was expected, including those who understood their illness 
predominantly in terms of indigenous explanatory categories. They conclude that since 
illness concepts and treatment are not uniformly bound and coherent, “the use of 
indigenous names does not preclude satisfaction with conventional psychiatric services” 
(Ensink & Robertson, 1999: 23). 
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In what appears to be the only study of its kind, Edwards (1986) conducted a standardised 
comparison of the interviewing, assessment and treatment planning procedures of 
indigenous healers and clinical psychologists. Although Edwards interviewed his 
participants, his approach is essentially positivist, and his results compare quantitatively 
the different practitioners’ “interview orientations”. Edwards (1986) reports that healers 
emphasised “supernatural” aspects of the interview, whilst the psychologists emphasised 
“natural” elements. He also reported significant agreement on diagnosis and treatment 
choices between the two groups, and perceptions by patients that both types of 
practitioners were equally helpful. He sets up for analysis two apparently mutually 
exclusive and oppositional categories – those of the natural and the supernatural. 
 
Edwards (1986: 1275) concludes that these findings confirm that people eclectically 
embrace both traditional and modern medicine, in addition to re-emphasising the 
“universal components of psychotherapy shared by both traditional healers and modern 
health professionals”. Unfortunately he does not elaborate on these universals. Edwards 
then recommends further research to assess the demand for, and implications of greater 
collaboration. Interestingly, Edwards (1986: 1276) also includes in his recommendations 
a call for research into the “effect of modernisation, education, economic, socio-cultural 
and political change on traditional and transitional societies and their related help-seeking 
behaviour”. 
 
 
2.4.5. Summary 
 
The present review of the literature has not been exhaustive. However, it has highlighted 
some of the salient features of the current debate. With some exceptions, problematic 
notions of the African worldview or personality continue to be used by contemporary 
authors in accounts of indigenous healing. Biomedical universalism in positivist-
informed research continues to dominate, and very few authors within mental health are 
conducting studies of indigenous healing that set out either to critically examine its 
processes or account for the social or discursive context which produces and sustains it. 
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Furthermore, those who advocate collaboration with indigenous healers do not set out 
any practical recommendations for such an endeavour, and make no reference to the 
possible difficulties inherent in such attempts. With the exception of L. Swartz (1986, 
1987, 1996), no specific attention has been paid to the ways in which the construction of 
cultural difference has structured the current debate on indigenous healing. 
 
Lastly, no studies have been conducted that have examined the implications for 
collaborative arrangements between mental health and indigenous healing, of the 
differing illness conceptualisations that practitioners might employ in their attempts to 
understand and help patients (Foster & S. Swartz, 1997).  
 
 
2.5. RATIONALE AND AIMS OF THE STUDY 
 
Mental health professionals’ diagnoses and conceptualisations of patients’ illnesses form 
an integral part of the practice of psychiatry, and are an important site for the production 
and reproduction (or subversion) of notions of culture (L. Swartz, 1989). These 
psychiatric formulations play a role in constructing identities for both patients and 
practitioners, as well as structuring power relations between them (cf. Terre Blanche, 
1997). Particularly in the South African context, these effects may depend to a large 
extent on the way “culture” is constructed in these formulations. Debates over whether an 
indigenous healing intervention would be “culturally appropriate” in a particular case 
would invariably involve some kind of negotiation of illness understandings between 
practitioners. This negotiation may resemble that between psychiatric professionals when 
deliberating over the significance of “cultural” issues in formulating a more “cultural” 
understanding of a patient’s problems (L. Swartz, 1998). For example, a particular case 
may be constructed as inscrutable to the understanding of “western” professionals, and 
amenable only to treatment by indigenous healers. On the other hand, psychiatric 
conceptualisations may hold greater legitimacy because of their incorporation of 
universalist aspects of biomedical discourse. Furthermore, a strict biomedical diagnosis 
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and conceptualisation would position psychologists and “allied” professionals, as well as 
indigenous healers, with fewer rights to speak and make treatment decisions. 
 
The purpose of the research is to examine discourses, with particular emphasis on 
discourses about culture and illness, in two distinct but related areas: i) psychiatrists’, 
psychologists’ and indigenous healers’ conceptualisations of a diagnostically ambiguous 
case; and ii) these practitioners’ talk about collaborating with each other in dealing with 
this case. In addition to the specific emphasis in this study on discourses of culture and 
difference, the reproduction of (or resistance to) power relations and positions in these 
discourses will also be examined. In so doing, it is hoped that the research will throw 
light on some of the issues that may arise as mental health workers and indigenous 
healers attempt to find a practicable arrangement for collaboration. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In this chapter I outline the methods and theoretical approach informing this study. I 
begin with a brief discussion of discourse analytic approaches in order to provide a 
theoretical context, and return to this in greater detail in the final section dealing with 
the analysis of the interviews. I also discuss the construction of the vignettes and 
interview schedules used, the selection of participants, and some issues related to the 
need for an interpreter. 
 
 
3.1.1. Discourse analysis  
 
The methodology employed in this study is largely informed by discourse 
perspectives which are concerned with the ways in which language constitutes the 
very things it appears to describe. Accordingly, much of the work of discourse 
analysis consists in teasing out the systematic construction of objects in language in 
ways that make them seem both natural and real. Furthermore, critical discourse 
analytic approaches, such as that of Parker (1992) –  which operationalises the work 
of Michel Foucault – attend specifically to the operation of power in discourses. 
Power, in this perspective, relates directly to the ways in which people are produced 
or positioned as certain kinds of “subjects”, and how this subjectification is effected 
through dominant, institutionalised knowledges, for example, psychiatric discourse 
(Levett et al., 1997). 
 
An attempt was made to utilise methods that follow from, and are consistent with, this 
theoretical approach. Having briefly described this background, I will now discuss 
these methods, and the reasoning behind their use. 
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3.2. CONSTRUCTION OF VIGNETTES AND INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Two vignettes were constructed and presented to the participants. Vignette 1 
described details of a “case”, while Vignette 2 described a scenario in a psychiatric 
hospital, in which an indigenous healer is consulted by mental health practitioners in 
relation to the case described in Vignette 1. Their construction is discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
 
3.2.1. Construction of Vignette 1 
 
Vignette 1 
 
Mr X is a twenty-five year old man living in [name of suburb] who is brought for help by 
his family. When asked what is happening to him he replies that this is not necessary as 
you can read his mind. He mentions that he can talk with spirits, whom he can see, but is 
evasive, and appears confused and preoccupied with something. He says that these spirits 
are here because there are people in his family who are jealous of him. He complains that 
he cannot think clearly and worries that he has done something wrong, but believes that a 
spirit may have entered his body and may be responsible for his actions. His family 
reports that there has been a change in him over the past few weeks as he spends more 
time alone than he used to, and is often found to be crying. 
 
The case in Vignette 1 was specifically constructed to elicit talk about culture and 
difference in relation to an African patient, and owes much to similar vignettes used in 
research by L. Swartz (1989). It alludes to some of the symptoms of schizophrenic 
and major depressive disorder, as described in the DSM-IV. Although other 
diagnostic systems are used in psychiatry, such as the World Health Organisation’s 
ICD-10, the predominant diagnostic system in use in the training of clinical 
psychologists in South Africa is the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV 
(Swartz, 1998), and the symptoms in this vignette were therefore checked according 
to its diagnostic criteria. 
 
Vignette 1 was designed so that from a psychiatric or mental health perspective, it 
would not fit unambiguously the diagnostic criteria for any one psychiatric disorder. 
Diagnostic complexity would invite speculation about aetiology and other details 
concerning the patient’s history. In practice, cases are often diagnostically complex, 
and in this sense, care was taken to ensure the vignette was as plausible as possible, 
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based on my own experience as an intern psychologist in ward rounds. I recognise 
that the choice of what I have termed a “diagnostically ambiguous” case represents a 
degree of bias towards psychiatry. No patients fit unproblematicaly into diagnostic 
categories, and the practice of diagnosis is an essentially reductive process (Kleinman, 
1988a; Good & DelVecchio Good, 1980). However, in practice there are degrees to 
which psychiatric categories may be said to “fit” with the way patients present, and 
“cultural issues” are often invoked to explain variations in presentation. A 
“diagnostically ambiguous” case would therefore facilitate speculation and talk about 
“cultural issues”. In addition, psychiatric terminology was omitted so that as far as 
possible, Mr X should not be thought of by the mental health professionals 
exclusively in psychiatric terms. 
 
The vignette also had to be accessible to the indigenous healers, who may or may not 
have had knowledge of psychiatric categories, since the healers interviewed had had 
varying degrees of contact with psychiatry.  With this in mind, an attempt was made to 
include Xhosa idiomatic expressions of distress in the case description. Not only 
would these expressions improve the vignette’s accessibility, but they represent 
important aspects of the way in which African psychiatric patients present to mental 
health services (Ensink & Robertson, 1996). Since patients who come to the attention 
of mental health professionals often employ terms such as amafufunyana or 
ukuthwasa to account for their experiences (cf. Lund & Swartz, 1998; Ensink & 
Robertson, 1999), the case vignette was also constructed so that symptoms resembled 
characteristics of amafufunyana and ukuthwasa (as described by Ensink and 
Robertson, 1996). 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of these features would facilitate talk about “cultural 
relabelling” amongst the mental health professionals (Swartz, 1998), and for example, 
how what may appear to be a symptom of psychiatric disorder might be a common 
and “non-pathological” phenomenon in another culture (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). Additionally, the theme of suspicion of jealousy from others was 
included since it may be read by psychiatric practitioners as suggesting an aspect of 
paranoia, while being an important part of suspicion of bewitchment, which has been 
found to be a common explanation given by African psychiatric patients for their 
difficulties (cf. Ensink & Robertson, 1996). Interestingly, there are frequent 
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references in the literature to the role of envy or jealousy in writing about “African 
psychopathology” (e.g. Hirst et al., 1996). In my experience as an intern, it is a 
common theme for discussion by mental health professionals. 
 
In important respects however, it may be argued that this vignette may not be 
particularly accessible to the indigenous healers, and this is an issue to which I return 
in the final chapter. Xhosa idioms for the expression of distress were gleaned from 
psychiatric research, and not checked for linguistic appropriateness. In addition, since 
the vignette resembles psychiatric referral notes to some extent, it could be argued 
that it is cast in an unfamiliar (to the healer) psychiatric narrative (Swartz, 1989; 
Ensink & Robertson, 1996). 
 
Finally, all of the participants were presented with the vignette in written form in 
English. However, the vignette was translated orally into Xhosa for the indigenous 
healer by an interpreter with whom I had previously discussed the vignettes. Aspects 
of the interpretation and some methodological difficulties are discussed below. 
 
Choice of location, age and gender 
 
The choice of Mr X’s suburb was made so that the vignette would likely be read as 
being about an African person. My having mentioned explicitly that he was African in 
the vignette might otherwise have prompted the participants to place undue emphasis 
on this detail. In addition, in my experience, in both ward rounds and case notes 
practitioners do not usually refer specifically to a patient’s “race” or “culture”, but 
rather allude to it by referring to the patient’s spoken language, or the area in which 
the patient lives. That it is possible to do this reminds one that social and geographical 
divisions in many South African towns and cities continue to exist along “racial” 
lines.  
 
Mr X’s age of twenty-five, and his gender, were chosen in order to limit the scope of 
discussion. First, the late adolescent/young adult period is cited as being the average 
age of onset for most major psychiatric disorders in the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994), and discussion about adolescent issues or those 
relating to middle or late adulthood was thus avoided. Second, S. Swartz (1995) has 
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demonstrated that in the history of mental health care in South Africa, the 
construction of African madness is both strongly “gendered”, as well as “racialised”. 
While both male and female patients are positioned in very specific ways in 
psychiatric discourse, according to their gender, there is a long history of discourse 
that specifically elides femininity with madness (Eagle, Frenkel, Green & Wolman, 
1991; Mills, 1997; Showalter, 1987). The complexities of an analysis of the gendered 
positioning of female African psychiatric patients is beyond the scope of this study. I 
also recognise however, that the separation of gender and “cultural issues” in 
discursive studies is problematic3. 
 
The interview schedule 
 
The interview schedule for Vignette 1 addressed the following themes (see Appendix 
A for interview schedule). Participants were asked to: 
 
· discuss diagnoses or to talk about what they thought was happening to Mr X; 
· provide an account of how they understood its having come about; 
· fill in other details they would have considered likely to be true of Mr X; 
· comment on the treatment or care Mr X would receive; 
· discuss any possible problems they might foresee in the care of Mr X; 
· relate any experiences they had had of dealing with people similar to Mr X in 
their practice. 
 
Responses to these questions could be examined for the ways in which, firstly, notions 
of “culture” are used in conceptualising Mr X’s affliction; and secondly, the manner 
in which such constructions are implicated in the positioning of Mr X, and of the 
different practitioners, in relation to one another. 
 
 
                                                             
3 I do not wish to imply here that constructions of “male psychopathology” are somehow gender-free. S. Swartz 
(1995) has discussed the very significant ways in which males, and specifically “black” males have been  
positioned in colonial psychiatric discourse. 
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3.2.2. Construction of Vignette 2 
 
The second vignette described a situation in which mental health practitioners and an 
indigenous healer are involved in working together in Mr X’s care. This vignette was 
constructed with the purpose of eliciting talk about cultural difference, differences in 
practice, possibilities for negotiation and conflict, and power relationships in 
reference to each other and the collaborative situation. The vignette is deliberately 
open-ended, to facilitate speculation and projection. 
 
Vignette 2  
 
This same Mr X is admitted to the local psychiatric hospital, and seen first by the 
psychiatric registrar. After examining him, the registrar refers Mr X to the clinical 
psychologist for psychological assessment. It turns out that there is difficulty in deciding 
on Mr X’s diagnosis, and how best to help him, and it is decided that an indigenous 
healer should be consulted. An indigenous healer is invited to the next case conference, 
at which the registrar who admitted Mr X presents his findings. This is followed by a 
presentation of the assessment results by the clinical psychologist. Some discussion 
follows, after which Mr X is called into the room for questions. The healer begins 
performing a divining ritual to identify Mr X’s difficulties. Once the healer is finished, 
Mr X leaves the room and more discussion follows. The indigenous healer is asked to 
give his/her understanding of the case. There is disagreement about what the healer says, 
and a debate ensues. 
 
Some authors within indigenous healing have expressed concern over the likely 
dominance of biomedicine in government proposals for collaboration (Van Damme & 
Maseko, 1997). In order to facilitate discussion in this regard, this vignette presents a 
scenario that is biased towards psychiatry in that collaboration takes place in the 
psychiatric hospital, and an indigenous healer is consulted only after difficulties with 
establishing a psychiatric diagnosis for Mr X are encountered. Furthermore, the 
indigenous healer performs the divining ritual during a psychiatric case conference. 
Case conference or ward round research has demonstrated that, apart from providing 
opportunities for joint decision-making in the interests of patients, these conferences 
also provide a site for the reproduction or contesting of professional boundaries and 
power relations (Swartz, 1989). 
 
As mentioned previously in the literature review, detailed descriptions of close 
collaboration between healers and mental health professionals are rare, and there are 
subsequently very few recommendations as to where or how collaboration should take 
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place. Of course, there are many other situations or settings in which collaboration 
may occur, but this vignette incorporates the characteristics of some of the reported 
instances of collaboration in the literature (e.g. Hirst et al., 1996). Postulating such a 
scenario would facilitate discussion of the kind of disagreements different 
practitioners might have, and how these might be resolved, within a mental health 
context. For example, in the psychiatric domain, concerns about power might be 
particularly salient for indigenous healers. 
 
The interview schedule 
 
The following themes were explored in this part of the interview: 
 
· general thoughts about the vignette; 
· responses to the way the case was dealt with (e.g. decision to admit Mr X, to 
consult the indigenous healer); 
· ideas about how the other practitioners might have understood what was 
happening to Mr X; 
· the kinds of disagreements practitioners might have with each other; 
· a projected conclusion for the vignette; 
· difficulties practitioners might encounter in working together on this case; 
· the advantages of working together on this case; 
· previous experiences of collaborating with either mental health or indigenous 
healing.  
 
Responses to these questions would provide more explicit texts of the construction of 
the different disciplines and their practitioners, and of the relationships between them. 
 
 
3.3. PARTICIPANTS 
 
Two clinical psychologists and a consultant psychiatrist from a psychiatric hospital in 
the Eastern Cape participated in the study. All three of these mental health 
professionals were chosen for their experience in daily contact with patients such as 
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Mr X. An indigenous healer (igqirha) who practised divination was selected from the 
surrounding area, who had had previous collaborative contact with psychiatric 
hospital staff. Significantly, as there are no “formal” means of establishing the 
reputability of indigenous healers, this one was selected on hearsay (snowballing). 
The last participant was someone who occupied the interfaces between many 
positions. She had been trained as a nurse and had worked in general hospitals and in 
primary health clinics, as well as having recently undergone training to become an 
indigenous healer. She also occupied the position of postgraduate student/academic, 
and was selected for the insight she might be able to give on her experience in 
working within both the indigenous healing and biomedical systems. No claim as to 
the representative nature of the participants used in this study is made, since from a 
discourse analytic perspective neither the size of the research sample nor the 
randomness of their selection are relevant. Rather, participants are selected for 
richness of material (Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor, & Tindall, 1994). 
 
 
3.4. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF AN INTERPRETER 
 
An interpreter was required for the interview with the indigenous healer, who spoke 
isiXhosa and was not fluent in English. The interpreter was selected for having had 
previous experience in interpreting for a number of other research studies in the 
Rhodes University psychology department. As I have mentioned above, the 
interpreter was required to present the vignettes orally to the indigenous healer, and 
interpreted during the rest of the interview. Prior to the interview, I met with the 
interpreter to discuss the ways in which the vignette was to be interpreted to the healer 
and immediately met with some difficulties. We could not be sure, for example, 
whether there were equivalent terms in Xhosa that would help the healer distinguish 
the role of a clinical psychologist from that of a psychiatrist. In addition, the 
interpreter was not involved in the transcription of the interviews, and thus no 
comparison could be made between the recorded translation, which would no doubt 
have been influenced by the exigencies of the interview situation, and the healer’s 
actual words. Although in a discursive study, the “true” intentions of the speaker are 
irrelevant (Parker, 1992), it must be acknowledged that the transcript that was finally 
used for this study was the production of the complex and layered interaction between 
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myself as researcher and both the indigenous healer and the interpreter (Bantjes, 
1999). I have attempted to address the significance of these difficulties of translation 
for the analysis in the final chapter. 
 
 
3.5. RECORDING AND TRANSCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEWS 
 
All of the interviews were audio-taped, and no notes were taken during the interviews. 
These audio tapes were then transcribed to obtain a general sense of the interviews, 
and did not include details such as stresses on certain words, and the lengths of pauses 
etc. The transcription notation used by Parker (1992) was considered sufficient for the 
purposes of this study. 
 
The following is a key to the transcription notation used in illustrative extracts in the 
analysis: 
 
[ ] Indicates words inaudible. 
( ) Indicates words whose accuracy is in doubt. 
. . .  Indicates a pause in speech, or that the extract was taken from the middle of a 
sentence. 
. . . .  Indicates that intervening speech has been omitted. 
/ /  Indicates words spoken while other is speaking. 
# Indicates points in the interview at which either the indigenous healer or the 
interpreter are speaking Xhosa. 
 
 
3.6. ANALYSIS OF THE MATERIAL 
 
Analysis of the transcribed interviews is informed largely by Parker’s (1992) 
approach to discourse analysis. Parker (1992) sets out a number of criteria for 
distinguishing discourses, which I will summarise here in order to outline the kinds of 
questions that will be posed to the text in the course of the analysis. 
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To begin with, Parker (1992: 5) defines discourse as “a system of statements which 
constructs an object”. Discourses also operate in the positioning of subjects, that is, in 
producing “particular types of self” (Parker, 1992: 9) which have varying rights to 
speak within particular discourses. In the construction of these objects, discourses also 
simultaneously and often implicitly map out a picture of the (social) world and how it 
works. The cultural “rules” implicit in these ways of organising the world may be 
identified by a consideration of how the discourses would deal with deviations from, 
or objections to the terminology used in the discourse. I will, accordingly, identify 
discourses in terms of their construction of objects (e.g. “culture” or “mental illness”), 
the positioning of subjects (e.g. the “white” psychologist as “ignorant”), and the kinds 
of (social) worlds they presuppose and “defend”. 
 
Discourses also refer to other discourses, and in this sense, they are always in 
dialogue and in conflict with other discourses. As Parker (1992: 13) states, “the 
contradictions within a discourse open up questions about what other discourses are at 
work”, and it is these contradictions that allow space for resistance to dominant 
meanings. Additionally, a discourse may be said to “fold around” upon itself and 
comment or reflect on its own way of speaking, in reference to its own contradictions, 
for example, or to assert how important it is to speak in that way. This allows 
instances of the discourse, as they appear in other texts (e.g. in debates about 
education), to be identified (Banister et al., 1994). 
 
The analysis that follows will therefore not be “staged-based”, or attempt to reflect 
positions in any holistic way, as discourses and subject positions intersect across the 
texts from the different participants. The discourses will be identified in the body of 
texts taken together, and their interactions and areas of overlap or contrast will be 
demonstrated. 
 
Parker (1992) lists three “auxiliary criteria” for identifying discourses which connect 
discourse analysis with critical practice. That is, they attend to the ways in which 
discourses may reproduce or subvert institutions, the power relations (and resistance 
to power relations) these institutions entail, and how discourses may have ideological 
effects through their connections with other discourses which sanction oppression. 
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These criteria are of crucial relevance for the present study, as they impinge on 
relations between the different practitioners in their talk about working together. 
 
There are some methodological difficulties associated with Parker’s (1992) approach 
which must be noted here. These relate to the application of Parker’s (1992) discourse 
analytic approach to the analysis of interviews, which represent co-constructed 
accounts (or generated texts) between the participants and myself as researcher. 
Parker’s (1992) approach deals very effectively with “pre-given” or “finished” texts 
constructed previously in another communicative event (Kvale, 1996), such as a 
toothpaste tube (see Banister et al., 1994), and these texts are analysed by Parker as an 
addressor of the reader. In contrast, the use of texts here which have been generated in 
the context of an interview situation, has necessitated a greater emphasis in the 
analysis on subject positioning (e.g. Hollway, 1989). Furthermore, Parker (1992) does 
not appear to address the interpretative difficulties of relating meanings in interview 
excerpts to the entire interview. This tension is reflected in the following analysis in 
that my reading of individual excerpts has been framed by my reading of the full 
interview. Moreover, when articulating discourses and their effects, in certain cases I 
could not find a corresponding interview extract containing all of the illustrative 
features. 
 
 41 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS  
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I attempt to draw out and examine the major discourses relevant to the 
research question, with reference to illustrative interview material. In the course of this 
analysis, I will elaborate only certain discourses separately. Other discourses will be 
discussed primarily in terms of their effects in interaction. For the sake of clarity 
however, it is necessary to provide a brief description of the discourses “identified” in the 
talk of the participants. They are as follows: 
 
· professionalist – in which “professionals” are constructed and separated from non-
professionals in terms of their expertise, commitment to an ethic of service, and their 
authority to identify (or define) illness and prescribe and supervise a course of 
corrective action; 
· psychiatric – in which the objects “mental illness”, its corresponding “patients”, and 
the myriad diagnostic and therapeutic principles and procedures they require are 
constructed; predicated on the ontological reality of “mental illness”; 
· psychological – in which “inner dynamics”, “emotions” and the injunctions to self-
reflexivity and self-rectification are constructed; 
· indigenous healing – in which afflictions such as “amafufunyana” and “ukuthwasa”, 
their manifestation in the body, and their roots in the neglect of traditional customs, 
are constructed. 
 
It must be noted that the identification of discrete discourses is attempted here only for 
the reader’s convenience, and belies the complex intertwining of multiple discourses 
throughout texts (Banister et al., 1994). Further, in listing them I do not intend to imply 
that they are unitary and homogeneous discourses. For example, there are significant 
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differences between the operations and effects of humanist-informed psychological 
discourses, and those of psychoanalytically-informed psychological discourses. 
 
“Discourses” identified in other studies, for example “similarities” and “differences” 
discourses (Kottler, 1990), and “culture-as-therapy” discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) 
are also evident in the interviews and are relevant to this analysis. A distinction could be 
made between these uses of the term “discourses”, and Parker’s (1992) definition of 
“discourses”. While Parker (1992) is concerned with the constitutive effects of discourses 
and their connections with institutions, these “discourses” are more “thematic”, and 
descriptive of versions of the social world (cf. Mills, 1997). 
 
I will now provide a brief overview of the analysis which follows. The vignettes elicited 
some of the expected psychiatric/psychological diagnoses and conceptualisations from 
the mental health professionals. In their discussions about differential diagnosis, there 
was much talk about psychosis, and to a lesser extent paranoid schizophrenia, affective 
disorders and anxiety disorders. As hoped for, there was much talk about “cultural 
issues” in their conceptualisations of the aetiology of Mr X’s problems. As I will 
demonstrate, the overriding features of this “culture talk” are two apparently 
contradictory constructions of African culture, both of which emphasise an African  
“collectivism” or “communalism”. On the one hand, African culture is constructed as 
highly familial and group-oriented, and therefore also holistic, natural, and hospitable to 
the mentally ill. On the other, the valuation of conformity and loyalty to ancestral 
tradition in African culture places strain on individuals, and is therefore also 
“pathogenic”. Both constructions of African culture are defined in contradistinction to a 
“western” culture, which is constructed as both harsh and pressurised, and also more 
“advanced”. 
 
The vignettes elicited discussion from both indigenous healers that contained interesting 
contrasts and resonances with the talk of the mental health professionals. The academic 
and professional training of the healer/nurse was evident in the interview, which contains 
many instances of formal academic discourse. Her responses were also structured along a 
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diagnostic narrative, reflecting perhaps her medical training. In contrast, the second 
indigenous healer’s response to the vignette and interview was quite unexpected and 
highlights some important assumptions and shortcomings in the conception and design of 
this study. These will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter. 
 
I would like to point out here that in drawing contrasts between the talk of the healers and 
that of the mental health professionals and referring to specific participants I do not wish 
to attribute these discourses to the intentions of individual speakers. Nor do I wish to 
reproduce the dichotomy between indigenous healers and psychiatric professionals. 
However, certain details about speakers (e.g. their profession, gender and “race”) are 
integrally bound up with their positions as users (and subjects) of discourse and are 
important to the analysis (Parker, 1992). 
 
Note that the interview extracts used below are identified by the position that is 
“speaking” (e.g. psychologist), and a number (e.g. [1]). Analytical comments in the text 
will refer to the number associated with the relevant interview extract. 
 
 
4.2. PROFESSIONALIST DISCOURSE 
 
What I would like to call a “professionalist” discourse provides the central axis around 
which the talk of the mental health professionals in particular appears to be organised. 
This discourse has close resonances with what may be termed a “rationalist” discourse 
(Banister et al., 1994), and it is noticeably absent from the interviews with both 
indigenous healers. The main feature of professionalist discourse is its sharp division of 
professionals from non-professionals. 
 
Psychiatrist [1]: Well I mean I would try and negotiate a pragmatic um approach ‘cos it’s 
really the patient that’s at stake not any of the professionals /hmm/.  
 
Psychiatrist [2]: I’m largely led by the family ok so if the family want to take him to a 
traditional healer, um you know I’d need to establish what their understanding is, what their 
expectations are, and if it was reasonable within that I would support it you know. 
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Psychiatrist [3]: Um . . . but I think when we identify potential sources of harm, wherever it 
might be, then we’d counsel the subject and their families. But you see we can advise but we 
can’t control, nor should we /ja/, but we can certainly advise 
 
Psychiatrist [4]: The patients need protection from psychologists, psychiatrists, traditional 
healers. 
 
Psychologist [5]: We as psychologists know, that the [words unclear] so to speak, is very 
much dependent on what the client wants, what the patient wants . . . . So in the end it’s 
gonna be the patient that decides what does the patient want to do. They kind of do anyway 
/ja/ so. In our profession psychiatric and psychological, the patient comes to us /hmm/, as 
they do to the healer . . . um but [ ] we often lose someone 3 or 4 times for 3 or 4 times before 
they come back and they’re ready to /hmm/ then be compliant with the medication. 
 
Psychologist [6]: . . . if there was a debate around a patient who I believed to be in serious 
difficulties . . . ok this would obviously tend toward more psychiatric issues than . . . but I 
would object if somebody said that I’ll er chuck a few of this and er kill that and everything’s 
gonna be fine, I’d be inclined to say no. 
 
The above excerpts illustrate some of the principal features of professionalist discourse. 
Professionals are positioned as dedicated to an ethic of service, and to the provision and 
betterment of care; they are responsible, careful and deliberate in their work, and are 
indignant about harmful practice, of which they are aware they may also be capable (see 
psychiatrist [3] and [4], and psychologist [6] above). Furthermore, professionals are 
identified by their rationality, moderation, and pragmatism, exemplified above in the use 
of words such as “negotiate”, “realistic” and “reasonable” (psychiatrist [1] and [2]). 
 
The recipients of professional services are referred to as clients, whose positioning in 
professionalist discourse constructs their needs and opinions as being of primary concern 
to the dedicated professional (psychologist [5]). For example, in the excerpts from the 
psychiatrist [2] and the psychologist [5], the decision to consult with an indigenous healer 
is not made unilaterally by professionals, but is allowed to be “patient- or family-driven”. 
At the same time, professionals in this discourse have the status of experts, and their 
clients, as well as non-professionals, are required to defer to their authority. As such, 
those people addressed by professionalist discourse feel a strong pressure to obey or be 
regarded as foolish and imprudent. The excerpt from the psychologist [5] above asserts 
that patients who insist on disobeying professional wisdom soon “come to their senses” 
about the need to be “compliant with the medication”. In this excerpt, together with that 
from the psychiatrist [3], professionals are positioned as paternally and sagely tolerant 
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and permissive of both the freedom and folly of patients. This positioning casts any 
expression of resistance from patients to the prescriptions of professionals as unwise and 
naïve. 
 
As Louw (1988: 76) argues, professional practice is based on a scientific body of 
knowledge and professionals’ high level of expertise is highlighted by requirements of 
stringent training and professional regulation, and consequently, professionals “do not 
have to argue their validity claims”. Importantly, the emphasis on service and skill serves 
to construct professionals as independent of political interests. Professionals are 
characterised by their membership of institutions; authority in their areas of expertise, the 
boundaries of which are carefully negotiated and policed; stringent procedures for their 
licensing and registration; and a sense of high status (Louw, 1988).  
 
Thus far in my discussion of professionalist discourse, I have focused primarily on the 
positioning of professionals in relation to the users or recipients of professional services. 
In later discussion, I will argue that professionalist discourse positions indigenous 
healers, as non-professionals, as both irrational and potentially dangerous. 
 
 
4.3. PSYCHIATRY AND “CULTURAL ILLNESS” 
 
In this section, I address the constructions of Mr X’s affliction in participants’ response to 
the vignettes, as objects within psychiatric and psychological discourses, and their 
deployment in arguments for (or against) indigenous healing and psychiatric intervention.  
 
When asked to outline their understanding of Mr X’s difficulties, the mental health 
professionals in particular placed great emphasis on the diagnostic difficulties presented 
by Mr X. As mentioned above, a number of possible diagnoses were advanced, and were 
talked about in such a way as to set in opposition the “ordinary run” of psychiatric illness 
on the one hand, and on the other, something that was unusual, “atypical” and defined by 
“cultural issues”. This “atypical” affliction is constructed in different, sometimes 
 46 
 
contradictory ways, that emphasise similarity or difference with “ordinary illness” to 
varying degrees. The similarities and differences discourses mentioned above are 
implicated here in the structuring of arguments for or against either indigenous healing or 
psychiatric intervention, and will be referred to during the course of this discussion. Their 
interactions in the construction of “cultural illness” are dealt with below. 
 
 
4.3.1. “Cultural illness” and psychiatry’s universal power 
 
Both psychologists in this study refer to the possibility that Mr X’s affliction is what they 
term a “cultural illness” (see excerpt from the psychologist [8] below). In their use of the 
term, the universality of both psychiatric diagnosis and treatment is clearly asserted. First, 
“cultural illness” is formulated as merely the culturally shaped expression of “known” 
psychiatric illness: 
 
Psychologist [7]: . . . the thing about cultures is they have different presentations, different 
illness behaviour if you know what I mean, ok. They articulate it differently. It doesn’t mean 
that the actual illness is different.  
  
The privileging of “form” over “content” in defining psychiatric illness (cf. Kleinman, 
1988) relegates cultural differences to mere embellishments upon the underlying reality 
of psychiatric illness. Thus, for example, the fact that a person hears voices is given 
greater diagnostic significance than what those voices are saying. The meaning of the 
voices may differ “across cultures” since the content is culturally shaped, but the very 
presence of voices signals pathology (cf. Parker et al., 1995). Significantly, this 
formulation allows psychiatric professionals to address cultural differences without 
having to make any substantial alterations to clinical practice. The patient’s own account 
is deemed largely irrelevant, and diagnosis, for example, becomes the simple reductive 
“decoding” of atypical symptoms to reveal the universal psychiatric illness (Good & 
DelVecchio Good, 1980). If the patient’s account can be dismissed, there is no need to 
develop a subtle understanding of his/her experience. 
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Alternatively, within what might be crudely termed a cultural relativist approach, 
“cultural illness” is constructed as an affliction unique to African patients (other patients 
have “ordinary illness”), which is related to anxiety or the stresses of family conflict or 
other social problems: 
 
Psychologist [8]: . . . you know prognosis depends on diagnosis okay so if this is just a 
cultural illness, if it’s related to family troubles and being unemployed and stuff like that, as 
long as there are no heavy substances thrown in then I would say that the prognosis could be 
quite good /ja/. 
 
Psychologist [9]: I mean we’re talking here about initiation and the diagnosis of thwasa I 
mean /ja/ that you know . . . can cause incredible anxiety /hmm/ in genuine cases that I’ve 
seen . . . 
 
Psychologist [10]: I mean if you want to know what thwasa is it’s usually more of an 
emotionally based kind of illness . . . 
 
In the excerpt from the psychologist [8] above we see cultural illness constructed as a less 
severe condition than is “real” mental illness, and therefore has a good prognosis. 
Additionally, in the excerpts from the psychologist [9, 10] above, ukuthwasa is 
mentioned as an example of this culturally-specific “cultural illness” (cf. Ensink & 
Robertson, 1996). 
 
Although the construction of an affliction unique to African patients (similar to the 
definition of “culture-bound syndromes”) may seem to rely on a kind of cultural 
relativism, in its definition by the mental health professionals as a variation of mental 
illness, there is a re-affirmation of psychiatric illness as universal. Within the context of 
psychiatric care, the simultaneous assertion of difference over and above a fundamental 
similarity helps to position mental health professionals as respectful of cultural 
difference, while being the exclusive owners of the skills needed in the alleviation of 
“cultural illness”. An extreme relativism removes psychiatry’s right to speak; this 
formulation furthers its continued hegemony. The construction of “cultural illness” as a 
variety of mental illness (whether culturally-specific or culturally-shaped) implies that it 
can be adequately managed by psychiatric professionals, and does not require the 
intervention of indigenous healers. 
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An interesting aspect of the construction of the power of psychiatry is demonstrated in 
the notion of its ability to effectively “contain” patients through both 
psychopharmacological means and through “listening to” them. Consider the following 
extracts: 
 
Psychologist [11]: But, if it is just a cultural thing, he’ll settle very quickly, ok. So the 
response to treatment is very very different to someone who is psychotic in a schizophrenic 
sense, ok . . . and if you take a schizophrenic person, someone who is genuinely psychotic 
and you treat them with antipsychotics, they still take a while to settle down /ja/. Typically 
these kinds of people, you take them out of the source of their trouble, and um, you contain 
them, and treat them, and they respond very very quickly /hmm/. Especially when they’re 
being listened to and heard you know. 
 
Psychologist [12]: I think whatever whatever’s happening to somebody . . . um . . . 
containment is the first order of business. The degree of the containment depends on the 
degree of the stress /hmm/ or distress that he’s in. Um . . . the bit about him sort of er 
spending time alone and crying and stuff like that suggests that he certainly needs to be 
contained. /hmm/ . . . . So the degree of insight often tells you how much they should be 
contained. No insight, much distress, lots of containment. Um good insight . . . perhaps um 
with manageable degrees of distress, less containment. You know on the sliding scale of 
containment probably therapy provides the most gentle degree of containment, when you see 
somebody, provide that initial contact, and let them go home /hmm/ ok. Now a hospital say 
in a locked ward, provides the most degree of containment for somebody without any insight, 
who’s held against their wishes /hmm/. And just very often that holding um is part of the 
treatment, you know it’s not to remove them from society, it’s a [ ] to provide them with a bit 
of structured [ ] so they feel safe /hmm/ ok . . . . Um off the top of my head I would say that 
whether it’s a cultural illness or not, there’s no doubt that he’s in distress he’s crying, he’s 
withdrawn, um he’s not coping ok. Um, and I would imagine . . . that there’s a chemical 
somewhere that’s going to . . . precipitate um his recovery. /hmm/ Ok? Just hasten it along a 
little bit. However having said that I must say that er if we could do the containment side of 
things better, if we could provide you know if money was spent on many more psychologists 
and many more nurses and we had better wards and stuff, then we could probably get away 
with medicating a lot less /hmm/ a lot of the time because the containment that we could 
provide would do a lot of that job for us /hmm/, ‘cos that’s what chemicals do, they just 
contain /hmm/. Um however, everybody is quite prepared to acknowledge these days that 
psychiatry is a very efficient and cost-effective service /hmm/ in that you get fairly 
immediate results um they’re getting more fine-tuned the chemicals themselves etc etc. 
 
In the first extract [11], the rapid response to psychiatric treatment is regarded as 
indicative of a “cultural” as opposed to “genuinely” psychotic condition. Psychiatric 
treatment is constructed as powerfully efficient in the alleviation of this “cultural thing”. 
“These kinds of people”, referring to those with “cultural illnesses”, are positioned 
squarely within the domain of psychiatry, being effectively “settled” by the provision of 
“containment”, which takes the form of separation from the precipitating stress (“the 
source of their trouble”), and “being listened to”. Practitioners’ frequent use of the 
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psychoanalytic notion of containment to describe the work of psychiatric care has been 
noted elsewhere (L. Swartz, 1989). The concept refers to an aspect of psychotherapy, 
requiring that therapists be sensitive to a patient’s unconscious communication (cf. 
Casement, 1984) and evokes images of the benign maternal “holding environment” 
(Winnicott, 1965; Ogden, 1986). 
 
There are a number of interesting features in the construction of “containment” in the 
second extract (psychologist [12]). First, as the foremost priority of treatment, the degree 
of containment indicated for the patient depends on his/her levels of insight and distress. 
This construction has some potentially pernicious effects, in that referring to locked 
wards and medication as “containing” associates the subduing and managing of patients 
who “lack insight” with images of benign maternal care. In so doing it obscures the fact 
that these interventions often involve the removal of patients’ rights, for example, in 
involuntary admissions (cf. L. Swartz, 1989). 
 
Second, there is a contradiction in the way “containment” is subsequently constructed in 
this extract. On the one hand, the construction of locked wards and chemicals as capable 
of containing patients, in effect, divorces the notion of containment from its 
psychotherapeutic roots, and the indispensability of communication and understanding in 
its provision. Containment therefore, is just as easily and effectively achieved through 
these physical means, as it is through an intersubjectively negotiated therapeutic 
understanding. On the other hand, containment achieved through the work of 
psychologists and nurses, which is necessarily more “psychological”, is preferable to that 
effected through medication (“we could probably get away with medicating a lot less”). 
While indicative of dissatisfaction with the exclusively medical treatment of patients, the 
effect of these contradictory assertions is to position mental health professionals as 
working to the best of their ability under imperfect conditions, in which the expediency 
of medication and locked wards in the provision of care acquires justification. While the 
favouring of psychopharmacological treatment may be appropriate or unavoidable, 
particularly in government psychiatric hospitals in which additional time and personnel 
are luxuries, the construction of psychiatry as able to efficiently treat and “contain” 
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people’s distress through medication, irrespective of the nature and subjective experience 
of their afflictions may contribute to the marginalisation of “psychological issues” in 
psychiatric care (cf. Swartz, 1991). The irony inherent in the prioritisation of the 
psychoanalytic notion of “containment” as the core of psychiatric care, in the excerpt 
above, is that it ultimately reproduces its own marginalisation. 
 
 
4.3.2. Difference and the ineffectiveness of “western” psychiatry  
 
Relativist formulations of “cultural illness”, as constructed within a differences discourse, 
fit well with arguments for the need for indigenous healers and the ineffectiveness of 
“western” psychiatry: 
 
Psychologist [13]: . . . If it’s not the usual western psychiatric stuff and it is cultural /hmm/ 
ok, the treatment is something that’s a lot more controversial ok. Then you raise questions of 
whether our idea of psychotherapy or our idea of counselling would be useful to this 
gentleman /hmm/ ok. My experience leads me to think that it wouldn’t /hmm/ ok. Because 
the way our models of counselling work is that we repackage people individually ok, we 
come from societies which are extraordinarily individuated /hmm/ ok, our sense of identity 
um flows from who we are as individuals . . . ok that’s certainly not true of (all) cultures. 
 
Psychologist [14]: But it has to be done genuinely. I’m I’m no good at killing goats /hmm/ 
and it doesn’t doesn’t work. It means nothing to me and I’m not perceived as having any 
authority in that field. 
 
Psychologist [15]: Um we each have our area of expertise, and we know a little bit about the 
others, but we’re not necessarily experts /hmm/. So I’ve already acknowledged that I might 
know something about medication, but I [ ] I might know something about ritual and 
indigenous healing, but I’m not placed to offer that service /hmm/. 
 
In the first extract [13] above, an argument for the ineffectiveness of “conventional” 
psychiatric treatment for Mr X is advanced, should he be suffering from a “cultural 
illness”. The problem of psychiatry’s inefficacy in Mr X’s case is framed exclusively as a 
problem of “cultural” difference. As in various other parts of the interviews, this is 
achieved through setting the “individualism” of “western” society and the “collectivism” 
of other cultures  (to which I return later) in mutually exclusive opposition. 
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In the remaining two excerpts from the psychologist [14, 15] above, we see the 
positioning of different practitioners within boundaries of expertise, which are defined 
and legitimated in the assertion and appreciation of difference. In particular, cultural 
difference functions to “naturalise” the division of expertise. For example, who may 
legitimately practice within each healing system, and which patients may receive 
treatment from which practitioner is argued on the basis of “genuineness” and 
“authority”. The fact that the psychologist above is “culturally different” from indigenous 
healers positions him as incapable of legitimately performing any kind of indigenous 
healing intervention. The ineffectiveness of “western” practitioners is an aspect of their 
selves, and not of their methods. That is, although they may learn how to do an 
indigenous healing ritual, their “cultural difference” would prevent them from performing 
it “genuinely” and with authority. 
  
The converse implication that indigenous healers have no authority in matters that might 
fall within the realm of psychiatry is clear. Thus, the criteria for professionalism dictate 
that an indigenous healer may only lay claim to the position of “expert” as a practitioner 
who practices within a separate domain, with different methods for different problems. 
That is, indigenous healers may be experts only in those fields in which psychology or 
psychiatry do not already have a claim. Thus “cultural difference” functions here as a 
compelling reason for the clear demarcation of boundaries of expertise and jurisdiction. 
 
Furthermore, in the positioning of indigenous healers, their expertise is confined to 
“cultural illnesses”, which are by implication suffered only by Africans. In consequence, 
the naturalising of domains of expertise between mental health professionals and 
indigenous healers on the basis of cultural difference is in danger of reproducing the old 
racialised division of care, or more likely, leading to practitioners abnegating 
responsibility for the “entire” patient. This division of labour in some way also 
legitimates a lack of serious attention to adapting psychotherapy, or “talking cures” as 
interventions for African patients (cf. Parker et al., 1995; L. Swartz, 1991). 
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4.3.3. The “demonology of madness” 
 
The prevalence of talk about psychosis and schizophrenia in the interviews with the 
mental health professionals is notable, and it is worthwhile here to examine the ways 
these objects operate in the indigenous healing/culture debate. In characterising the 
formulation of psychosis within psychoanalytic discourse, Parker et al. (1995: 115) speak 
of the “demonology of madness”. They argue that dominant constructions of psychosis as 
both frightening and “other” within clinical psychiatric discourse produce genuine 
feelings of alarm and concern in practitioners. While the prevalence of talk about 
psychosis and schizophrenia may be attributed to the inclusion of these diagnostic 
possibilities in the vignette, in some respects, it is also an indication of the position of 
psychosis as the emblematic image of madness, and its status as the raison d‘être of 
psychiatry. The psychiatric professionals interviewed here were particularly concerned 
that “genuine” psychosis not be trivialised or misunderstood, and there was notable 
emphasis in their talk on diagnosing it correctly. 
 
As a first point, it is useful to note that of particular concern to these professionals was 
the difficulty of determining whether something is “genuine” mental illness or “just 
cultural”. In the following excerpt [16] we are warned about the hazard of misinterpreting 
“real” psychiatric illness as “merely” “cultural belief system”.  
 
Psychiatrist [16]: I would be uncomfortable if active psychopathology, which could be 
assisted by western-style treatments, is merely written off as cultural belief system, if we 
missed the depression, if we missed the schizophrenia. 
 
“Cultural belief system” is something false, a red herring that could divert one from the 
fundamental and more serious business of diagnosing and treating bona fide 
psychopathology. As an initial response from the participant to the diagnostic 
complexities presented by Mr X, the above extract [16] seems to caution against undue 
emphasis on “cultural sensitivity”, given the existence of mental illness. In the following 
extracts we see the seriousness and force of this warning turning on the construction of 
schizophrenia (as an epitome or extreme case of mental illness) as universal, frightening 
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and dangerous. This is achieved through formulations that highlight both the hard 
empirical reality of schizophrenia, and the extreme nature and destructive consequences 
of psychosis: 
 
Psychologist [17]: And there’s no question in my mind you know that er . . . that 
schizophrenia’s a real thing /hmm/, it’s it’s an absolutely real thing, and er it doesn’t it 
doesn’t it doesn’t er resolve. Schizophrenics don’t just like suddenly wake up and they’re not 
schizophrenics anymore. If they do they weren’t ever schizophrenics. 
 
Psychologist [18]: I’ve always thought of it as something that’s not nice to happen, should be 
treated as quickly as possible, and um if not treated, if left to linger actually has destructive 
consequences. And I would like to maintain that no matter what culture the person comes 
from /hmm/. 
 
Psychologist [19]: Psychotic people you can’t really relate to in that sense, because like there 
might not be an active stressor going on, or the stressor might not (yet) be severe, but the 
person has broken down and has unravelled completely, and as such you can empathise with 
his suffering but you can’t quite put yourself in his place, because it’s just a little bit too far 
removed /hmm/ ok.  
 
Psychologist [20]: We always, we always say that the proof um comes out in time /hmm/. Ok 
if you make the correct diagnosis it becomes really apparent over time and likewise if you 
screw it up, if you make a mistake, um and you incorrectly diagnose the person, that too 
becomes apparent /hmm/ ok. 
 
As I have mentioned above, Parker et al. (1995: 116) have demonstrated how 
psychoanalytic accounts of madness construct a reality for clinicians that is both 
“fantastic and frightening”, and makes all the more “other” the experience of those it 
talks about. This psychiatric language is organised in discourse such that clinicians 
experience genuine fear and concern for both their own and their patients’ safety. The 
above excerpts from the psychologist [17, 18, 19] produce similar effects. Interestingly, 
the accentuation in the construction of madness of both its irrefutable reality and severity 
may be employed in defence of psychiatry, by attacking the romanticism of anti-
psychiatric arguments (e.g. Szasz, 1961) that deny the existence of mental illness (cf. 
Parker et al., 1995). 
 
It seems that seriously entertaining the idea of collaboration with indigenous healers 
occasions a moral lesson (the excerpt from the psychologist [20] above takes this form) 
which establishes science and professional standards as safeguards against a naïve anti-
psychiatric sentiment, or against charlatanism. The emphasis on psychiatric expertise and 
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professionalism serves to justify the exclusive rights of mental health professionals to talk 
about and define human suffering in psychiatric/psychological terms, in the philanthropic 
and therefore indisputable interests of public safety. There are clear parallels here to the 
ways in which the proliferation and increasing popularity of “alternative medicine” has 
been received in medicine and psychiatry (cf. Foster & S. Swartz, 1997). 
 
An important implication of this “reaction” to talk about “cultural issues” and indigenous 
healing is that it indicates the potential for such debate to challenge psychiatric power and 
produce depathologising accounts of human suffering. In many of the interviews with the 
mental health professionals, the “diagnosis” of a “cultural illness” is regarded as 
preferable to that of schizophrenia, if it can be made, since it is constructed as having a 
better prognosis. As L. Swartz (1989; 1998) has noted, attempts to conceptualise patients’ 
problems in “cultural” as opposed to “psychiatric” terms may represent efforts by 
practitioners to provide an illness narrative with a potentially better outcome. 
Discursively, these attempts might be understood as re-positioning mental health 
professionals as effective and necessary healers, in the face of discourses about patients’ 
problems that threaten to position them in disempowering ways. Various constructions of 
African culture may be seen to lie behind such attempts, and it is to these that I will now 
turn. 
 
 
4.4. AFRICAN CULTURE AS “PATHOGENIC” 
 
African culture is constituted in different ways throughout the talk of the mental health 
professionals in particular. As I will demonstrate, it is constructed in their talk as both 
discrete and homogeneous, and as if it were applicable to all Africans. This problematic 
construction of culture is employed here in discourses that both reproduce and subvert 
racist discourse. It also appears in accounts that represent attempts, as I have mentioned 
above, to construct patient narratives with better outcomes, and therefore functions in 
resisting psychiatric power. In contrast, as an object of psychiatric discourse, African 
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culture appears as a force in African lives that is decidedly pathogenic. It is to the latter 
construction of African culture to which I will turn first. 
 
 
4.4.1. The “cultural stressors” of “collectivism” 
 
The mental health professionals in this study repeatedly employed notions of what they 
termed “cultural stressors” or “cultural demands”, in reference to African patients. Its 
frequent appearance in the participants’ talk about African culture and brain fag 
syndrome, as discussed below, is notable.  
 
The “cross-cultural psychology” literature contains many references to the classification 
of cultures as either “collectivist” or “individualist” (cf. Lonner & Malpass, 1994). This 
somewhat problematic and dualistic theoretical lens is often employed in interpreting the 
comparative behaviour of people from different cultures. African culture is said to be 
“collectivist” in that the interests of the social group are more highly valued than those of 
the individual. Such characterisations of African “collectivism” occur in the literature 
describing the African “worldview” (e.g. Bodibe & Sodi, 1997; Hickson et al., 1990), 
and these serve to construct a psychological need for Africans to conform, and to be 
strongly identified with the group. These notions are reproduced here in the talk of the 
mental health professionals. Consider firstly, the following extract: 
 
Psychologist [21]: . . . Sometimes a stressor is that someone hasn’t been to initiation school 
/hmm/. That’s another question that would be . . . you know you might ask if you suspected 
that kind of a problem /hmm/ you know that in itself can be a stressor and is a stress that you 
see sometimes in that context /hmm/ [ ] you know. In a sense he’s not responding to, I don’t 
know, what you would call cultural demands /hmm is this um . . . / and and the whole self-
esteem thing that goes with it [ ] anxiety [ ] that in a sense . . . must be acted out. 
 
In this excerpt [21], the failure to complete male initiatory rituals is identified as a 
possible stressor contributing to Mr X’s condition. In this account, culture is reified as a 
natural, invariant and coercive force, with which Africans must comply, or suffer 
deleterious psychological consequences. A “cultural illness” may result, if there is failure 
to respect or conform to the dictates of cultural tradition. 
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The strength of culture’s “pull”, and therefore the severity of “cultural stressors” or 
demands made upon Africans depends on their being “steeped in culture”, implying a 
pure or true culture in which people may be immersed. Furthermore, the existence of a 
homogeneous culture uncontaminated by the influence of other cultures, as reflected in 
the “nostalgia for the village square” (Bibeau, 1997: 32), is thought to be more likely in 
rural, as opposed to urban areas. Consider the following: 
 
Psychologist [22]: . . . He was a very traditional . . . steeped, quite steeped in culture as well, 
he had a traditional marriage he didn’t marry in court [ ] . He didn’t speak any English /oh/ [ 
]. So I would say that this cultural influence was very strong for him. (He wasn’t very) 
westernised in (terms of his beliefs). So again that often could increase the chances of that 
sort of . . . of thwasa having a real meaning for him /hmm/. 
 
In both of the above excerpts from the psychologist [21, 22], “cultural stressors” are 
formulated in such a way as to construct culture as making fundamental (“deep”) and 
irresistible demands upon African people. Culture is something Africans are compelled to 
obey, not something that they participate in as active agents. There is an evocation in 
these accounts of caricatured images of Africans as fundamentalist or dogmatic religious 
devotees. Conversely, by implication, the speaker who uses this term, who is not African, 
is not dictated to by a “western culture” but is positioned as objective and impartial, a 
rational participant in society. Wetherell and Potter (1992) have described similar 
constructions by Pãkehã (European) New Zealanders in their talk about Mãori culture. 
Through the formulation of Mãori as the “cultural group”, it is implied that the Pãkehã do 
not have culture, but rather a “technical, practical outlook . . . the attitudes of the modern 
world” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 135). 
 
In much of the mental health professionals’ talk, ideas that African people value 
conformity more than individuality are set in distinct contrast to images of the modern 
individual divorced from social responsibility and intent only on the pursuit of individual 
gain, or growth. In fact, those Africans who pursue individualistic achievement may 
suffer the envy of others – regarded by the psychologist in the following extract as 
another possible “cultural stressor”, with which African people cope poorly. 
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Psychologist [23]: And they do so [enter into psychotic states], um for reasons of poor 
adjustment to cultural stressors, so in this case, Mr X might well be suffering because he, as 
he says, there are people in his family who are jealous of him. Perhaps he’s doing well at 
school and he’s suffering the envy of other people. It seems that in [ ] cultures er. . . nobody 
likes being envied, but er it seems to have far more devastating consequences /hmm/ in [ ] 
cultures when you’re not seen to be . . . moving along with the rest of the people, you’re a bit 
ahead of the bunch. There’s a little Xhosa proverb that says um. . . “the nail that sticks out 
must be hammered down”, /hmm/ something like that. 
 
Severe psychological consequences are constructed in the above extract [23] as the result 
of achieving beyond one’s “status” and being guilty of excessive individualism, of being 
somehow exceptional, and therefore suffering the envy of others. It is interesting to note 
how the reference to a “Xhosa proverb” functions in legitimating this account. The use of 
a proverb here implies a common sense, shared by most African people, and in so doing 
it authenticates what is being said. It also positions the speaker as “wise”, and as 
possessing “cultural knowledge”. 
 
The reference to academic achievement as provoking the envy of others deserves a more 
detailed consideration, since there is remarkable potential in this account for legitimating 
racist arguments that attribute African people’s lack of social mobility or failure to 
succeed in “modern” South African society to “their culture”. These issues crystallise in 
the notion of brain fag syndrome, something which both psychologists referred to in their 
talk about cases they have dealt with in practice. 
 
 
4.4.2. Brain fag syndrome 
 
Brain fag syndrome is regarded by many as a “culture-bound syndrome”, and is reported 
to be common in Africa where it is thought to afflict secondary school and university 
students, often just before important examinations (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994; Ensink & Robertson, 1996; Bodibe & Sodi, 1997). It comprises somatic and 
cognitive aspects of anxiety, such as poor concentration and forgetfulness, which students 
attribute to “thinking too much”. It is usually believed to be caused by bewitchment. 
Guinness (1992, cited in Ensink & Robertson, 1996) argues that this condition could be 
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the result of the tremendous familial and financial pressure placed on students due to the 
high value placed on education in African countries, as a route out of poverty. 
 
Both psychologists referred to this syndrome to illustrate some of the issues they deemed 
relevant to the case of Mr X. One of the psychologists recounted the case of a female 
patient with a history of scholastic difficulty, presenting with anxiety, headaches, fatigue 
and aimless wandering, precipitated by repeated failures at school, who was employed, at 
that time, as a school teacher. She had been to see an indigenous healer, who had 
“diagnosed” ukuthwasa and recommended that she begin training to become a healer, 
which she subsequently began but had to discontinue due to lack of funds. According to 
the psychologist, she felt that she would be cured if she could complete her training. In 
the following excerpt, the aetiology of her condition and recommendations for treatment 
are discussed: 
 
Psychologist [24]: . . . in assessing her it was just pretty obvious that she wasn’t . . . she 
didn’t have great intellectual capacity I mean she failed often at school /hmm/ and she was 
really functioning in a job that was far too demanding for her. In a sense ja the stresses of the 
job were bringing on this symptomology. Um and I mean I don’t know if you know what 
brain fag syndrome is /I’ve heard of it/ ja, ja, ‘cos it almost sort of [ ] the tiredness, the 
anxiety around work /hmm/ not being able to concentrate . . . . Um ja she was put on 
medication but we also advised her to basically resign [ ] from teaching ‘cos obviously she 
couldn’t cope, and also to continue with the thwasa training, ‘cos in a sense it had, it may 
relieve her of that . . . you know academic stress you know. 
 
In the above extract [24], “academic stress” is particularised in the construction of brain 
fag syndrome, as peculiar (and central) to its aetiology. Removal of the academic stress is 
thought to alleviate the condition. The recommendation to resign from teaching and to 
continue with the indigenous healing training is reasonable in the light of the patient’s 
history and beliefs regarding what would be helpful to her, and constitutes what is often 
regarded as good psychiatric practice in that it takes into account her social context. 
However, the medicalisation of the patient’s difficulties achieved through a diagnosis of 
brain fag syndrome individualises her problems, locating the source of difficulty within a 
deficient intellect. 
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Empirically, “academic factors” may well be associated with brain fag syndrome, and the 
patient mentioned above may also have been experiencing academic problems. However, 
the construction of brain fag in the above extract, as an example of “cultural illness”, is 
emblematic of a very  particular construction of African identity. The attribution of the 
antecedents of brain fag to the very specific stress exacted by academic pursuit and work 
achievement reproduces notions of African people as being both uninterested in, or ill-
equipped for, intellectual pursuit, and ultimately, inherently incapable of coping with the 
demands of modern life. 
 
The following extract [25] is interesting because it occurs in the context of discussion 
about the possible disagreements between mental health professionals and indigenous 
healers, and the hazards of idealising or romanticising indigenous healing when there are 
“psychiatric issues” involved. These hazards are underlined through an analogy with the 
difficulties of managing brain fag syndrome: 
 
Psychologist [25]: . . . if there was a debate around a patient who I believed to be in serious 
difficulties . . . ok this would obviously tend toward more psychiatric issues than . . . but I 
would object if somebody said that I’ll er chuck a few of this and er kill that and everything’s 
gonna be fine, I’d be inclined to say no . . . What we get very often is, and this is something [ 
] um . . . what we have is um cases of um kids coming to us who suffer from what’s now been 
called in the literature as “brain fag” syndrome. Ok um and these people again adjustment 
disorder with perhaps [  ] psychotic features related to er what happens at school very often 
um because people are not coping. Ok and there’s such a powerful pressure on people to get 
an education these days . . . it’s like a magic ticket to . . . there are clearly a lot of people who 
are breaking down in school ‘cos they simply can’t cope. And um we often like to say, we test 
you see . . . psychologists test and we test and we find out that the IQ is about sort of among 
the 60’s or the 70’s or whatever, and we say listen, you’re not going to pass. Um . . . what you 
need to do is find something else to do and er there’s just no [words inaudible but to the effect 
that they wouldn’t accept this news] /hmm/. 
 
It is interesting that a patient’s refusal to accept a diagnosis of brain fag syndrome (and 
therewith a prophecy of inevitable failure) is used here to illustrate the naiveté and 
obstinacy of an indigenous healer in the face of psychiatric problems (see italicised part 
of the above extract). It is clearly naïve for an indigenous healer to prescribe rituals for 
“serious difficulties”, as it is irrational for a person to persist at school when the “fact” of 
low intelligence has been proven. The extract continues: 
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Psychologist [26]: So we think, go back to school, there’ll be so much pressure you’ll relapse 
again, and every time you relapse it will get worse for you /hmm/. But you know, it’s not a . . 
. an appropriate thing to say these days. So there seems to be a lack of understanding around 
that kind of thing /ja/. You see we grew up in a society where from the moment you’re born, 
you’re streamed . . . , everybody finds their little niche. And er you sort of you know aptitude 
testing, you know it’s a much more individuated process, much, much, much more you know. 
Um and er it’s just a totally different developmental process to what seems to be going on in 
the schools these days . . . totally totally different. 
 
This excerpt [26] then develops into an account that constructs African culture (and its 
difference from “our”, “western” society), as the source of African people’s difficulties 
with brain fag syndrome. Its justification for the abject social and economic status of the 
majority of African people in “western”, individualistic society, by attributing this to the 
“developmental processes” in African culture, reproduces racist ideological effects. 
 
Tangled within the two extracts above is the implied positioning of African indigenous 
healers as naïve and unrealistic about their limitations, and therefore incapable of dealing 
with people who have “serious difficulties”. As will be demonstrated later, the 
juxtaposition of hard realism with naiveté, and rationality with irrationality appears 
throughout the interview texts, in the construction of both African culture and the 
positioning of healers. 
 
In summary, popular (and academic) notions about “collectivism” in African culture 
merge with psychiatric discourse in the construction of the object “cultural stressors”, 
with the result that African culture itself becomes constructed as somehow 
psychologically harmful or pathogenic, in the exertion of its requirements of conformity. 
On the other hand, the positioning of Africans as backward or inherently deficient, 
especially in the ability to cope with the demands of modern life, is also bound up with 
this construction of African culture (in the construction of brain fag syndrome). Africans 
are therefore positioned as vulnerable simultaneously to the stressors of both “tradition” 
and “modernity”. As I will argue below, this vulnerability is framed by the psychiatric 
division of normality from abnormality, informed by humanist psychological discourse, 
that takes as its normative model of health the self-directed, unconflicted and rational 
individual (e.g. Rogers, 1961). This fictional ideal (Hall, 1996) is implicated, within the 
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language of “psychological integration”, in the positioning of Africans as precariously 
poised at the margins of “traditional” and “modern” social and technological worlds. 
 
 
4.5. “CAUGHT BETWEEN CULTURES” 
 
Psychologist [27]: Now the problem is that a lot of um . . . a lot of er . . . [tsk] local people 
these days um . . . are caught between cultures. /hmm/ And depending on their social class, 
and depending on um their level of education, they might be incredibly resistant, we find that 
in the hospital that the patients themselves sometimes can be quite resistant but the nurses as 
well, incredibly resistant to anything from their own culture, they’ve, they’ve bought into the 
western psychiatric model completely. 
 
Psychologist [28]: I mean in a sense it’s being caught between two spheres of meaning. Part 
of . . . in a sense, often part of getting over . . . it depends on what sort of mental illness we’re 
talking about now but . . . whether it’s emotionally based or (biologically) based [ ] um part 
of getting over it is creating some sort of meaning around it or understanding and in a sense 
what the symptoms mean for one’s life. And er I would imagine if you were caught between . 
. . two . . . cultural spheres or whatever it can be very confusing to make sense . . . of certain 
symptoms [ ] /hmm/. ‘Cos on the one hand you might be required to perform certain rituals 
or go through certain procedures to . . . traditionally to address (the symptoms) [ ] so it would 
obviously create some sort of anxiety /hmm/ [ ]. Just in terms of being able to resolve the 
situation ‘cos I think I mean a lot of it has to do with faith [ ] belief that a certain . . . that 
something’s gonna resolve [ ]. /ja/ 
 
Psychiatrist [29]: . . . nurses of the sort of type we’re talking about, um Xhosa, speak the 
language, from the culture etc, they’re in a very difficult position because they’ve got one 
foot in each camp really. They’re trained in western style mental health, um and yet their 
roots are in traditional indigenous er belief systems. And I think it’s really difficult for them 
to straddle that er belief divide. It’s very . . . er very few of them manage integration of that, 
and I think expecting them to perform cultural brokering functions when they themselves 
haven’t really sorted out the . . . the difficulty of incomplete um ascription to certain belief 
systems I think it’s asking too much. 
 
In the excerpt from the psychologist [27] above, the adoption of the “western psychiatric 
model” by African patients or even psychiatric professionals (nurses), is constructed as a 
kind of betrayal of one’s true cultural heritage, a heritage that rightly belongs to African 
people. The racialised essentialism in this formulation constructs a “true cultural identity” 
that Africans are forsaking by adopting “western” concepts. Indeed, the expression of this 
sentiment by African authors within mental health is not uncommon (e.g. Bodibe & Sodi, 
1997), and receives powerful backing from popular discourse in current debates about an 
“African Renaissance” that encourage the renewal of appreciation for African culture, 
and cast multiple identifications as disloyal (e.g. Mangcu, 1998). An association with 
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psychoanalytic discourse may also be made here, in the repeated use of the word 
“resistant”. This usage underlines the power of the psychologist to speak authoritatively 
about the unconscious (“true”) nature of Africans, which is being denied in this 
“resistance”. 
 
The second extract above from the psychologist [28] draws from existential-humanist 
psychotherapeutic discourse (e.g. Rogers, 1961), in a formulation that posits the 
possibility of estrangement from one’s true identity, resulting in a painful internal 
“incongruence”. As a result, being “caught between” represents an obstacle to recovery 
from mental illness, since it evidently hinders the creation of unitary meaning around 
one’s symptoms. It also renders indigenous healing rituals ineffective, due to a “loss of 
faith” in their efficacy. 
 
The extract from the psychiatrist [29] was given in response to my suggestion that 
working with someone who was familiar with both indigenous healing and psychiatric 
practice (for example, a psychiatric nurse who had some experience with indigenous 
healing), would be preferable to an indigenous healer per se (cf. Green, 1994). In this 
extract [29], being “caught between cultures” is constructed as a particularly 
incapacitating experience, being the cause of much psychic confusion and emotional 
turmoil. The pathologising discourse of psychiatry in which changing social and cultural 
identifications are framed here positions (African) nurses as psychologically “not-whole” 
(implied by “integration”), and confused and therefore unable to participate meaningfully 
in the psychiatric team. The contribution that nurses might make to discussion about 
“cultural issues” is disqualified on this basis. Moreover, defining the pathology of others 
involves a simultaneous outlining of the boundaries of one’s own psychological health 
(cf. Parker et al., 1995). The assertions about the incapacity of nurses are framed in a way 
that implies that the speaker, as (“western”) psychiatric professional, has already 
“managed integration” or that there is no integration to have to undergo4. 
                                                                 
4 I will not attempt here what would be a complex discussion of the racialised and gendered aspects of this pathologising discourse. 
Nurses, as both African and female (nurses in psychiatric hospitals tend to be female), are further pathologised within male-dominated 
medical psychiatry. Their positioning here bears a strong resemblance to the way doctor-patient relationships are structured (cf. Parker 
et al., 1995). 
 
 63 
 
Africans in a post-apartheid South Africa (“these days” – see extract from the 
psychologist [27] above) are positioned in this discourse as particularly vulnerable to the 
confusions of social and cultural change. Moreover, in these extracts it is only African 
people who experience (and suffer) the ambiguity of cultural complexity; others, it is 
implied, live in homogeneous cultural worlds. This construction is interesting when one 
considers the increasing acceptance within psychological discourses of post-modern 
notions of social worlds and identities as inherently fragmented (Hall, 1996). That 
identities are constructed in the intersection of multiple and contradictory cultural and 
social discourses is not pathologised in, for example, Lacanian-informed psychoanalysis. 
 
The dominance of the discourse which constructs Africans as having difficulty dealing 
with rapid social change resulting from “modernisation”, and the introduction of 
“western” culture, is reflected in numerous accounts found in the literature. For example, 
Ulin (1974, cited in Green, 1994: 32) speculates that indigenous healers may serve the 
function of “change brokers” in times of rapid social and cultural change, who are able to 
guide and reassure Africans who are “torn by the conflicting expectations of their 
changing worlds”. Other authors have framed the difficulties faced by Africans as the 
result of conflict between “western” concepts and values and traditional ones (Wittstock 
et al., 1991).  Explanations for amafufunyana that formulate it as an “idiom to deal with 
anxieties associated with failure to cope with the changing way of life in colonial and 
post-colonial society” are another example (Hirst et al., 1996: 274). Lastly, some 
attempts to deconstruct conceptions of “South African insanity” have also reproduced 
images of the conflicted African, at the mercy of competing paradigms or discourses (e.g. 
Long & Zietkiewicz, 1999). 
 
In certain respects, these ways of speaking about Africans parallels those of Pãkehã New 
Zealanders in their talk about the social and psychological malaise accompanying 
Mãoris’ loss of culture as a result of life in “western society” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
I will take up useful aspects of Wetherell and Potter’s analysis in the following section. 
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4.6. AFRICAN CULTURE AS THERAPEUTIC 
 
Constructions of the psychologically damaging effects of the abandonment of African 
culture, or of its clash with modern “western” culture are reproduced in accounts in both 
the mental health literature (e.g. Hopa et al., 1998; Wittstock et al., 1991) and media (e.g. 
Mangcu, 1998) that prescribe the therapeutic benefits of African culture as remedy to this 
anomie. The frequently cited concept of ubuntu is emblematic of notions of a hospitable 
and holistic African communalism circulating in popular discourse, that can be found, for 
example, in debates on African culture in the media (cf. Mangcu, 1998). 
 
As I will argue, in prescriptions by both indigenous healers and mental health 
professionals in the interviews to “heed the call” of culture, or tradition, we see culture 
discursively constructed as a buffering force against the stresses and ills of modern 
society. The formulation here of the plight of culture-less or confused Africans in post-
apartheid South Africa parallels that of Wetherell and Potter (1992), who identify what 
they term a “culture-as-therapy” discourse in the construction of Mãori culture in New 
Zealand. They argue that such a discourse positions Mãoris as “non-persons”, searching 
for structure and secure identity, and in their absence, prone to delinquency and crime 
(Wetherell & Potter: 131). Culture becomes offered as a remedy for social discontent, 
and as a solution that “encourages pride in oneself and a self-esteem based on knowledge 
of difference” (Wetherell & Potter: 132). Importantly, they argue that the de-politicised 
culture-as-therapy formulation obscures the social and political grievances of Mãoris by 
re-interpreting their plight as psychological malaise. Wetherell and Potter’s (1992) 
analysis is replete with examples of the way culture-talk functions in an ideological way 
to depoliticise social issues. This construction has important resonances with 
developments in the South African context. For example, some have regarded the 
psychological benefits accruing from a return to Zulu traditions as a potential solution to 
violence in Kwazulu-Natal (cf. Koch, 1997), while others have proposed the recognition 
and appropriation of ubuntu as a guiding principle for effective governance and “people-
centred” development (cf. Mangcu, 1998). Parker (1997) has commented on the 
disciplinary functions (in the Foucauldian sense) of the concept of ubuntu, as it is 
 65 
 
currently being used in psychological research and in the South African media, in 
producing good and responsible African citizens. 
 
 
4.6.1. Benevolent primitivity 
 
Psychologist [30]: You know we don’t have, we don’t have the . . . the cultural metaphors um 
to allow places in society for people that are mentally ill, you know what I mean. Our 
society’s based really on how quickly you can jump up and down, and how many hours you 
can put into your job, and how much money you can make, it’s it’s high pressure stuff 
/hmm/. Industrial age /hmm/. Um information age. But nevertheless, their culture has 
allowed them to occupy that place where they can be mentally ill, and they can perform some 
other function as well /hmm/. And I find that fascinating because our culture I mean that 
would be completely anathema to our culture. You know as soon as you become mentally ill, 
you’re fit for nothing /hmm/, largely speaking, despite our adherence to human rights and 
stuff like that you know it’s not cool to be mentally ill you’ve got to hide it /ja/ you know 
what I mean because the consequences are severe. But imagine living in a culture where you 
could go in and out of psychosis, weird things could happen and there’d be no penalty 
attached to that. 
 
African culture, in contrast to “western” society, is constructed in the above extract [30] 
as highly hospitable to those who are mentally ill. According to this account, in African 
culture the mentally ill are neither stigmatised nor separated from society, in contrast to 
those in the harsh, unforgiving circumstances of performance-orientated “western” 
society. In particular, it is implied that the communalism and leisure of the African way 
of life allows the mentally ill to blend in anonymously and still be productive community 
members. The romanticised primitivity of African culture functions here in a kind of anti-
psychiatric critique of psychiatry’s regulation of “western” culture, and its power to 
divide (and incarcerate) the ill from the non-ill. Lucas and Barrett (1995) demonstrate the 
centrality of “primitivist” themes in structuring debates on culture and psychopathology, 
and contrast two recurring images in the literature, a “barbaric”, degenerate primitivism 
on the one hand, and a harmonious and therapeutic (“Arcadian”) kind on the other. L. 
Swartz (1998) argues that the “cultural relabelling” of African patients’ afflictions may 
be seen as attempts to substitute the negative primitivism bound to images of madness 
(cf. Parker et al., 1995), for the positive primitivism of African culture. This construction 
of the benevolent primitivity of African culture has resonances with the unequivocally 
favourable constructions of African culture mobilised in arguments for the value of 
 66 
 
indigenous healing in mental health care. For example, the southern African Regional 
Conference on Mental Health Policy held in 1995 concluded with the following 
resolution: 
 
It is affirmed by this conference that the traditional African worldview and spirituality is 
highly promotive of mental health as regards its understanding of ubuntu, the high value it 
places on family life and its deep love and respect of children and the elderly. It is affirmed 
that the authentic practice of traditional African forms of healing is vital to mental health in 
Africa, its holistic approach to healing has much value for all to learn (quoted in Bodibe & 
Sodi, 1997: 191). 
 
The emphasis on the therapeutic benefits of the “traditional African world-view” in the 
above quote is striking. The word “traditional” clearly locates the harmonious, respectful, 
family-oriented, and spiritual/holistic qualities of African culture in the past. This 
construction therefore urges a return to a prior, pristine version of African culture. 
 
 
4.6.2. Indigenous healing: psychotherapy “for the people” 
 
Psychologist [31]: . . . the patients themselves sometimes can be quite resistant but the nurses 
as well, incredibly resistant to anything from their own culture, they’ve they’ve bought into 
the western psychiatric model completely. Whereas those of us that are applying it a little 
more directly um . . . are quite happy to acknowledge you know /hmm/ that there’s a place 
um for a more appropriate intervention /hmm/ and we think that these indigenous healers 
actually provide that, in many ways /hmm/. If you if if in your own cultural way you believe 
um in spirits, and and sacrifice, and all those things, um just in the same way that in our 
culture we believe um in the individual, and the pursuit of various . . . goals, um and the 
conflicts that brings . . .  
 
Healer/nurse [32]: . . . but um the interesting thing I find in the music, is that it’s almost like 
regression therapy that music because the drum beat is very definitely a doom-do-doom 
which is the cardiac, which is like the cardiac cycle, which is the two closures of the atrial 
valves and of the ventricles, and even the anklets and stuff that they have to wear around 
their feet is like this sound of blood flowing, so it’s almost like, and in fact when they talk 
about it when that thwasa in his training state, before the liminal state, is likened to being 
back in the womb. He’s removed out of society, and put into nature, which is the same as the 
baby in the womb, and a lot of the symbolism is associated with being in the womb, so this 
music is perhaps like a form of taking a person back into his foetal state /hmm/, and then in 
that way they can work out his illness. 
 
Healer/nurse [33]: I don’t think any psychiatrist or psychologist should worry about that, if it 
is, if the patient has been diagnosed as being called, because they actually get perhaps the 
best psychotherapy they can in the care of the healer in that situation, where you’re doing 
dance therapy, you’re doing dream therapy, you’re doing all sorts of things which are 
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recognised within the . . . you know . . . psychotherapy /ja/. You know, that . . . that world. So 
there’s a lot of focus and love and attention to the person. 
 
In the first extract [31] above (part of which has been discussed before), a rationale for 
collaborating with indigenous healing in mental health is structured in terms of its 
“cultural appropriateness”. This is a construction found repeatedly in the literature 
advocating collaboration with healers (e.g. Bodibe & Sodi, 1997). Interestingly, the 
speaker, as a psychologist, is positioned in this account as knowing more about patients’ 
“true (cultural) needs”, which they have disavowed in favour of the “western psychiatric 
model”, than patients themselves. Furthermore, both psychologists and indigenous 
healers are positioned in this account as possessing the authority and skill to address the 
“core dilemmas” or problems of their respective cultures, what Littlewood (1997: 84) has 
termed “culture healers”. Importantly, Littlewood (1997) argues that this discursive 
positioning of healers, whether psychiatric or indigenous, as “culture healers” serves to 
reinforce their influence and maintain their clientele. 
 
The second excerpt [32] from the healer/nurse above describes an aspect of the trainee 
healer’s initiatory dance ritual. It is remarkable in its invoking of metaphors of “natural” 
and “deep” bodily processes in constructing indigenous healing processes. The 
association of the drum beat with the “cardiac cycle”, with reference to the anatomical 
details of the heart’s “atrial valves” and “ventricles”, links this rhythmical aspect of the 
ritual with an essential and involuntary biological function. Additionally, the likening of 
the dance ritual, and the entire process of initiation into healer status, to a return to a 
foetal state in the womb, valorises regression to a child-like, innocent state as a means to 
healing. Indigenous healing thus constructed is powerfully legitimated as an ancient, 
primordial form of healing that is “close to nature” and rooted in the past. It is 
unsurprising that the primal images used in the construction of indigenous healing have 
been attractive to some within the field of transpersonal psychology, and the term 
regression therapy is derived from transpersonal psychological discourse (e.g. Grof & 
Grof, 1989). To my knowledge, there is as yet no published literature on African 
indigenous healing within the field of transpersonal psychology in South Africa, but it 
 68 
 
has been regarded as an African form of “shamanism”, which is thought to be a 
worldwide phenomenon (David Edwards, personal communication, 1996). 
 
In the third extract [33] above there is the further use of psychological terms to describe 
the work of indigenous healers. Dance rituals become “dance therapy” and the 
interpretation of dreams by healers becomes “dream therapy”. As I will argue later, the 
use of psychological terms to characterise aspects of indigenous healing may be read as 
an attempt to enhance its credibility and that of its proponents. 
 
In summary then, the mobilisation of this conglomeration of eulogistic images of African 
communalism and Arcadian primitivity (Lucas & Barrett, 1995) in psychiatric practice, 
in the literature and in the media, has the potential to function in the construction of a 
powerfully compelling argument for the necessity for collaboration with indigenous 
healers. 
 
 
4.7. THE MARGINALISATION OF INDIGENOUS HEALING 
 
In this section I outline some of the contradictions in the construction of indigenous 
healing, and in the positioning of the relevant practitioners. The imperative to be 
inclusive appears to structure the talk of all of the participants, including that of the 
healers (cf. L. Swartz, 1996). All spoke of the value of complementarism in enriching and 
broadening the scope of both mental health and indigenous healing care. 
 
Psychiatrist [34]: Um the registrar’s consulted with a psychologist, why shouldn’t the 
registrar consult with an indigenous healer? 
 
Psychiatrist [35]: . . . Let’s say for example that he was depressed, I would try and negotiate 
that he would continue on a course of antidepressants while he was undergoing indigenous 
healing. Um so I mean I think I would pragmatically look for complementary, potentially 
beneficial complementary interventions being used by all parties. 
 
The above extracts [34, 35] are structured by a professionalist discourse, emphasising a 
“team approach” in which the contributions from different practitioners are accorded 
equal validity as a matter of pragmatic (and democratic) principle. Professionalist 
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discourse casts any overt assertion of hierarchical authority as dogmatic and irrational (cf. 
Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988), and both of these extracts 
position the speaker, in marked contrast, as open-minded, tolerant and non-authoritarian. 
In the extracts above, the power differentials that necessarily exist between practitioners 
are effectively played down. As I will demonstrate, in spite of the persuasiveness of these 
“inclusivist” constructions, indigenous healing and its practitioners occupy a clearly 
marginal position in relation to mental health, and particularly psychiatry. Some 
participants were clearly aware of this, and their talk about collaboration reflected a 
concern with the question of credibility. 
 
I hope to demonstrate further that the subjugation of indigenous healing knowledge 
within mental health care, and specifically in the context of the psychiatric institution, is 
sustained largely through the dominance of rationalism. This rationalism is embodied in 
both psychiatric and professionalist discourses that interact to reinscribe the “otherness” 
of African indigenous healers. This construction of “otherness” is centralised in images 
of African intellectual primitivity, which reproduce “African minds” as bound to 
irrationality and superstition. Another aspect of the marginalisation of indigenous healing 
is the alternation in some accounts between the minimisation and accentuation of its 
tangible effects. In those that warn about the potential dangerousness of indigenous 
healing methods, they are constructed as able to bring about substantive effects. For 
example: 
 
Psychiatrist [36]: . . . My other concern is um some of the er indigenous healing practices 
involve potentially toxic um treatments which um you know purging type treatments which 
er I think can be dangerous . . . physiologically. 
 
Alternatively, the potentially positive effects of indigenous healing are downplayed in 
accounts of its benefits: 
 
Psychiatrist [37]: My experience is that in the norm, traditional healers are quite good at 
working . . . of picking up whether there are mental health issues which are beyond them [ ] 
/hmm/ . . . . I think it’s extremely difficult to manage acute psychosis in a traditional healing 
system. 
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Psychologist [38]: . . . It seemed that doing his thwasa training was going to relieve him of a 
hell of a lot of anxiety. 
 
Healer/nurse [39]: And by sorting it out in a ritual fashion, then it actually alleviates a lot of 
that anxiety which is causing that /hmm/ [ ] that state /hmm/. 
 
Psychologist [40]: . . . to continue with the thwasa training, 'cos in a sense it had, it may 
relieve her of that . . . you know academic stress you know and [ ]. And again it was 
something she . . . it gave her meaning for her symptoms it was something we could give her 
. . .  meaning that people need . . . I suppose to work with their own symptoms and start 
curing themselves in a sense /hmm/. 
 
 
These accounts attribute the effectiveness of indigenous healing to “reducing anxiety” 
[38, 39] and “providing meaning” [40]. While these results are not undesirable, in the 
world of psychiatry, they are the peripheral, nonessential aspects of care. 
 
Psychologist [41]: . . . [S]o the debate might be around you know, what are you going to do 
Mr Healer /hmm/, and er does the goat really have to have it’s throat cut you know, ‘cos you 
can imagine, say say . . . I mean just imagine that the healer says right fine, what I’m gonna 
do, is I’m going to get the whole family onto the ward, I’m gonna get a goat and I’m gonna 
butcher it here on the grounds /hmm/. I can tell you right now that er, myself I’d probably 
object, I don’t like animals suffering and er other psychologists feel even stronger than I do 
/hmm/ you know there’s no ways . . . there’s no ways I would I could be pressed actually I 
would actually not be able to watch having . . . to watch some screaming animal be butchered 
/hmm/.  
 
The above extract [41] illustrates the use of extreme examples in the construction of 
indigenous healers and their work, which serves to further undermine their credibility. 
The example of the slaughtering of the goat serves to position the speaker as one whose 
moral sensibilities have been offended. As Billig (1987; cf. Wetherell & Potter, 1992) 
demonstrates in his discussion of moderation and extremism, moderation is only 
identified and defined through contrasts with “extreme positions”. Thus, this construction 
reinforces the positioning of psychiatry as a bastion of rationality, recognised through 
both its moderation and its indignation at extreme practices. 
 
 
4.7.1. A refuge of unawareness 
 
Healer/nurse [42]: . . . I would say that this is not something western biomedicine or mental 
health could really address very well, because if you believe that you’re being affected by 
spirits and witchcraft, then the best person to go and treat . . . to go and sort it out, to do ritual 
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action to counteract that would be a healer or a specialist who knows how to work with the 
spiritual world, the spiritual realm /hmm/, in terms of what he understands. In terms of . . . if 
he understands that er either a goat has to be slaughtered or certain medicines have to be 
applied and that is what . . . that is all he can believe will sort out his problem /hmm/, then 
that is the only way he will actually get around it because no matter how much you may tank 
him up with antidepressants or antipsychotics he will still believe /hmm/, that there is this 
ultimate problem which hasn’t been sorted out. And by sorting it out in a ritual fashion, then 
it actually alleviates a lot of that anxiety which is causing that /hmm/ [ ] that state /hmm/. 
 
There are interesting discursive features in the above extract [42] in the way that it 
contrasts the implied aims of therapy found in psychoanalytic discourse, with those in 
indigenous healing discourse. In psychoanalytic discourse, self-reflexivity (“insight”) is a 
highly valued therapeutic goal. In the above extract, Mr X’s belief in spirits or 
bewitchment is framed in a manner similar to the notion of a defence (cf. Malan, 1979), 
in that it protects him from awareness of some more fundamental issue, presumed to be 
unconscious. A particular aim of psychoanalytic psychotherapy is to interpret defences 
and in so doing to expose to the patient the underlying, forbidden or anxiety-provoking 
reality (Malan, 1979). The rationale that Mr X requires a healer who will work within his 
belief system, without evaluating its helpfulness to his particular circumstances, implies 
that “insight” (read: “reality”) is not possible or desirable for African patients. This may 
be expanded in relation again to notions of African primitivity and the construction of 
African people’s inability to tolerate the anxiety of “culture-less” existence in a culture-
as-therapy discourse. Moreover, in this extract Africans are “othered” in that it is implied 
that they do not participate in the required therapeutic discourses of “self-inspection” and 
“self-rectification” (Foster & S. Swartz, 1997: 17). These are powerfully entrenched 
discourses in the context of modern “western” culture. In addition, this recommendation 
assumes that healers are automatically better able to work in accordance with Mr X’s 
acculturated (rather than psychological) needs, and neglects the role of healers in 
structuring and reproducing norms of health and illness that may be undesirable for Mr 
X. 
 
There is no doubt that this healer/nurse would strongly object to my reading of her 
statement. However, the constraints of psychiatric discourse, and to a greater extent, the 
rationality which constitutes it, impels talk which constructs African subjectivity as 
bound to superstition and not rationality, and the work of healers as non-substantive. 
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There is also an intimation of resistance to biomedical reductionism in this account, since 
it elevates the “psychological” above that of the medical, viz. medication won’t work if a 
person believes in a different illness reality. 
 
 
4.7.2. Positioning of indigenous healers 
 
In the following paragraphs I discuss the implications of the intersection of 
professionalist and psychiatric discourses for the ways in which indigenous healers are 
positioned in the debate on collaboration. 
 
Professionalist discourse 
 
Psychiatrist [43]: . . . Indigenous healers have a different perspective on things, well you 
know a different . . . prioritisation I suppose, and intellectual pursuit is not necessarily one of 
those. So you know a case conference is, which I mean apart from hopefully arriving at a 
reasonable diagnostic and management plan, are also essentially largely intellectual pursuits. 
Traditional healers don’t (go for that) /hmm/. Um I must say and I know that this is on tape, 
but I . . . my somewhat jaundiced view . . . of what has happened, essentially revolves around 
money and power /hmm/. Um and that the first sort of fleeting flirtation between mental 
health and indigenous healing, I think from mental health’s side was twofold. One was how 
can we broaden our scope of understanding, how could we treat patients better, um and I 
think there was goodwill in that. I do think that er in my experience, the traditional healing 
motive for the flirtation was essentially, how do we access the money and the power. And 
that’s all about medical aid accreditation, um and you know medical funding, reimbursement, 
that sort of stuff. And I think when that moved onto a different plane, it um the traditional 
healers stopped coming to the case conferences and [ ] /hmm/ . . . . in principle, I don’t have 
any problems with um . . . with suppliers, indigenous healers, mental health professionals etc 
being reimbursed, or competing for the same sort of reimbursement funding, but then we 
must all play by the same rules /hmm/. We must all be regulated in the same way. Um 
registered etc, and I’m aware that there have been some problems in the indigenous healing 
sector, on that count. So I must, I’m somewhat cynical, I think traditional healers saw 
cooperation as a means to an end, money, status and power /hmm/. 
 
In the above extract [43], professionalist discourse intersects with notions of the “African 
personality” to position indigenous healers in opposition to mental health professionals. 
Healers are positioned as uncontrolled, greedy for money and power, individualistic and 
non-intellectual, and are distinguished from the benevolent, educated “western” 
professional in pursuit of knowledge and better patient care. 
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Moreover, since indigenous healers are motivated only by personal gain, rather than the 
objectives of knowledge or better patient care, they are also potentially dangerous and 
need to be subjected to restrictions. Significantly, the words “control”, “manage”, 
“regulate”, and “handle” appear frequently in various other sections of the mental health 
professionals’ talk, in reference to both healers and patients. For example: 
 
Psychiatrist [44]: So I think carefully managed, indigenous healing could enrich the 
vocabulary of mental health. 
 
In addition, in the following extract [45] the potential dangerousness of indigenous 
healers is related to a stubborn, irrational approach to treatment, a construction which has 
appeared previously in the discussion of brain fag syndrome: 
 
Psychiatrist [45]: So I think my concerns about traditional healing are, ‘cos there’re lots of 
benefits in indigenous healing, but my concerns are one . . . is that useful chemical or 
psychological interventions . . . potentially useful ones are not allowed, ok, and my other 
concern is um some of the er indigenous healing practices involve potentially toxic um 
treatments which um you know purging type treatments which er I think can be dangerous . . 
. physiologically. 
 
This obstinacy of indigenous healers manifests in the threat that they might insist on 
outright rejection of psychiatric treatment in favour of their own methods. Further 
hazards stem from scientifically untested treatments, which may be physiologically 
harmful. The emphasis on the physiological or chemical dangers presented by indigenous 
healing allows this psychiatric professional to speak about a subject on which he is a 
recognised authority. Thus the psychiatrist is accorded the right, in this discursive 
position, to judge the suitability or otherwise, of indigenous healing for a particular 
patient. 
 
As I have mentioned previously, a rational, problem-solving approach is emphasised in 
the talk of “multidisciplinary” professional teams in particular (cf. Billig et al., 1988). 
The valuation of a democratic approach in such teams, in which the opinions of all 
professional members are deemed equally important, casts any competition or pursuit of 
status for its own sake, or the overt assertion of hierarchical authority as irrational. 
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It is not difficult to see how conceptualisations of Mr X’s distress in biological terms 
(with the frequent and especial emphasis on schizophrenia as a worst case), and in terms 
of the demands of efficient and responsible care, would serve to undermine arguments for 
working together with indigenous healers. If indigenous healers can at best provide only 
supportive, spiritual care (similar to the marginalisation of psychotherapy in psychiatric 
practice), but would slow down the process of care, and at worst are ill-motivated and 
even dangerous, it is best that they keep to themselves. 
 
Psychiatric discourse 
 
In this section I will demonstrate some of the difficulties speakers experience when 
seeking to employ the language of indigenous healing in its own terms, within psychiatric 
or biomedical contexts. As one psychologist put it, in reference to the training indigenous 
healer’s initiatory illness (ukuthwasa): 
 
Psychologist [46]: Now a lot of people who go through that, are, in my opinion, genuinely 
mentally ill, ok.  
 
The statement above [46] represents a common belief about indigenous healers, to the 
extent that some authors have taken pains to refute it (e.g. Schweitzer, 1977). The 
significant point is that the discursive dominance of rationalism in psychiatric contexts 
constrains talk about spirits or possession in terms of irrationality and madness, and 
positions those who employ these ways of speaking as pathological. As Foucault has 
argued, the construction of the pathological depends on the division of reason from 
unreason, or rationality from irrationality (1971, cited in Parker et al., 1995). Irrationality, 
being defined by a loss of the ability to doubt or reflect, is something that requires 
policing. 
 
As I have mentioned above in the discussion on “cultural relabelling”, calls for 
collaboration with healers may reflect some hope that patients’ “pathological” talk about 
spirits may to some extent be “de-pathologised” through indigenous healers’ 
“sanctioned” talk about spirits. Thus, for example, it is said that healers can provide an 
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understanding of the patient’s “cultural context”, so that hearing voices and belief in 
spirits are not mistakenly construed as signs of psychiatric illness. However, healers who 
insist on employing indigenous healing discourse, in which, for example, ancestral spirits 
are given a literal, ontological reality, find themselves positioned within universalist, 
biomedical psychiatric discourse as superstitious, dogmatic, and therefore ultimately, 
“mad”. This positioning is demonstrated in the excerpt below from the healer/nurse: 
 
Healer/nurse [47]: Oh I see ja they’d probably think I was totally mad [laughs]. I know that’s 
what they would think you know . . . . But ja because I know the scepticism of western 
biomedicine and that’s what I’d say for myself because I’m fully conversant with that mode 
of thought, I mean I was like that myself but, but . . . I mean that’s what I’ve been struck with 
that many healers are not quite so aware of how little the white . . . the biomedical scientific 
people actually disbelieve /hmm/. I think they tend to assume that most people believe in the 
spirits and that we’re just slightly different, we do things differently /hmm/. Um you need to 
actually tell them, no they don’t believe in it, . . . they think it’s a bit mad, they actually 
they’re quite surprised /hmm/. You know they take it for granted that we all believe in the 
spirits, but that we just do things differently. Um but I would be very aware that and I would 
perhaps find it quite difficult to communicate with . . . communicate my ideas /hmm/ with a 
western healer . . . trained healer if I had suspicions that this man was being called because I 
think they would probably question my credibility. But I would probably argue from the 
point that if this man [Mr X] is convinced that he is being bewitched or whatever, the only 
way you can solve it is to actually give him the remedies and the rituals that he believes are 
needed /hmm like within his . . . / ja within his cultural context. You know this whole mind 
over matter business which has got it’s empirical sort of logic in it /hmm/. So ja you know 
not actually having to say, well the spirits are actually getting you [laughs] you know, just 
rationalising it on sort of like a psychotherapy [ ] is that you know, if you believe you’re 
gonna be better, you will get better /hmm/. 
 
Although the use of the word “mad” is intended here somewhat in jest, it indicates an 
awareness of her positioning as indigenous healer within psychiatric discourse. This 
“awareness” points to the way discourse may “fold around and [reflect] on its own way 
of speaking” (Parker, 1992: 14). As this healer expressed in the introduction to this study, 
once she had undergone the training to become a healer, she was regarded with suspicion 
by colleagues as having become “deluded” or mentally ill. Furthermore, this instance of 
reflection may point to the pathologising of this healer’s discursive positioning “at the 
margin” of two cultures, constructed as both discrete and different/conflicting. As a 
“white”, educated nursing professional who is also an African indigenous healer, she had 
been labelled as mentally ill, or as having deserted rationality. 
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As this particular text [47] illustrates, one way in which to maintain one’s credibility, and 
avoid accusations of “madness” in arguments for indigenous healing intervention is to 
play down bewitchment or “calling” by literal ancestral or other spirits by “translating” 
patients’ irrational, and therefore pathological, language into more acceptable, and in this 
case, psychological terms. Paradoxically, while this might contribute to indigenous 
healers’ credibility within the mental health field, it also undermines the distinctiveness 
of the healer, who is reduced to a kind of “Africanised” psychologist. In the collaborative 
situation, what this implies is that a healer who may not be able to do this “translation” 
within a psychiatric context may well be written off as “deluded”.  
 
Resistance 
 
Psychologist [48]: This is the kind of scenario that we would have um perhaps in our naiveté 
a couple of years ago imagined could have happened, /ja/ indigenous healer’s coming onto 
the grounds. I understand in Canada what they’ve got there with the native Indian population 
is that they’ve got in the grounds of the psychiatric hospital, they’ve got like a wigwam, and 
they’ve got a guy sitting in a wigwam you know /ja/. And I mean that’s what we thought was 
gonna happen here that we’d have a . . . we’d have like a like a tame healer who would like 
er be fully into the way we thought /hmm/ and would love to find out, you know, the kinds of 
metaphors and things that we do, and would come in here and sit at ward rounds and we’d 
say what’s your opinion and he’d say no this is not for me you keep him /ja/ but that person 
over there, that’s somebody that I can work with, in the way that psychiatrists and 
psychologists often do that /hmm/. But that hasn’t happened at all and I don’t know that 
that’s happened at all anywhere in the country /hmm/. 
 
There is a significant instance of resistance in the above account [48]. Although it 
reproduces the positioning of indigenous healers as dogmatic, unreflective, unwilling to 
acknowledge their limitations, and therefore incapable of participating in rational 
collaboration, this account may also be read as ironical. The quaint picture of the native 
American healer in his wigwam indicates a reflection within psychiatric discourse on its 
power to dominate indigenous healers in collaborative efforts. The crux of the resistance 
inherent in this reflection lies in the almost absurd and conspicuous picture of the rural, 
primitive healer (in a “wigwam”) resident in the hospital, and the irony contained in the 
reference to the “tame healer”. The positioning of indigenous healers as “untamed” or 
“untameable” means that they cannot simply be expected, or made to conform to the 
conventions of rationalist psychiatric practice. Thus paradoxically, this account subverts 
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dominant professionalist representations of indigenous healers as merely money- and 
power-hungry, since it normalises indigenous healers’ reluctance to collaborate as 
legitimate resistance to co-option by psychiatric power. 
 
 
4.7.3. Positions for mental health professionals 
 
Psychologist [49]: But er you know empirical disciplines like psychiatry is a much much 
more there’s a higher degree of common consensus amongst psychiatrists as to what is good 
psychiatry, than in psychologists where people have a much more sort of individual . . . non-
empirical kind of way of working things out. Um [ ] empirical disciplines . . . they can be 
quite snotty about people who don’t fit into /hmm/ you know what can be shown or proved or 
demonstrated etc. 
 
I have up to now been relatively silent on the issue of the relationship between 
psychological and psychiatric discourses. Psychological discourse, it may be argued, 
occupies a “middle position” in the debate, and is perhaps more compatible with 
indigenous healing concepts. This is an opinion expressed both in the literature and by 
the mental health professionals in this study. The concern in psychological discourse with 
the “inner” dynamics and particularly the social relations of patients lends support to the 
view that both theoretically and practically there might be less incongruence between 
positions offered to psychologists and indigenous healers. The psychologists interviewed 
spoke of psychiatry being largely unsympathetic to “non-empirical” disciplines, referring 
to both psychology and indigenous healing (see for example, the extract from the 
psychologist [49] above). This recalls the long history of clinical psychology’s struggle to 
gain a legitimate, distinctive identity, while achieving some degree of scientific 
respectability vis-à-vis the medical institution, both internationally and in this country (cf. 
Louw, 1988; Foster & S. Swartz, 1997; Parker et al., 1995). This continued contest for 
credibility within a psychiatric context appears to frame much of the talk of the 
psychologists in particular. 
 
Within many psychiatric hospitals, the de facto organisational hierarchy sees medically 
trained psychiatrists and doctors in managerial and administrative positions, overseeing 
the work of psychologists (Foster & S. Swartz, 1997). The medically dominated arena of 
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the psychiatric hospital, in addition to the constraints of limited time and personnel, 
would appear to discourage the development of more sophisticated and subtle 
understandings of African patients: 
 
Psychologist [51]: . . . [A]s a psychologist you know in the hospital context that’s 
psychiatrically run we work very much um . . . to put it positively, in support of the doctors 
but not making the decisions and the doctors’ work loads are quite high, so in a sense the aim 
is to . . . stabilise the patient on medication and then (release him) /hmm/. So it doesn’t really 
give time to go into the intricacies of every /hmm/ case. 
 
The psychologists positioned themselves as working under imperfect conditions, to an 
extent, against the problems of medical reductionism, while at the same time 
acknowledging the role and necessity of psychiatric practice. 
 
Psychologist [52]: . . . [T]hese cultural issues often revolve around . . . the bad psychiatrist 
would say, schizophrenic, load them up with medication, and of course that achieves 
absolutely nothing /hmm/. And a bad psychologist, would do the equivalent thereof . . . and 
say um . . . you know schizophrenia’s just a label, um it’s caused by society’s labelling 
certain behaviours etc etc. 
 
The moderation expressed in the above account [52] may be read as an indication of the 
difficulties thrown up by the constraints of professionalist and psychiatric discourse, 
which, as I have argued above in the case of indigenous healers, functions powerfully in 
disqualifying and excluding talk about indigenous healing in its own terms. 
 
“Cultural issues”, and indigenous healing seem to provoke talk that positions 
psychological and psychiatric discourses in opposition to one another. As I have already 
noted, it is interesting that the question of indigenous healing has been framed within the 
context of debates largely hostile to psychiatric discourse. I read this as an indication of 
the potential for “cultural issues” and the question of indigenous healing in psychiatry to 
function as a site of resistance to the dominance of biomedical discourse. Although talk 
about culture, as we have seen, can be patronising to African patients, it can also provide 
space for a challenging voice within psychiatry. In arguing that practitioners’ “cultural 
relabelling” of patients may express a hope in its potential to counteract recidivism in 
psychiatry, L. Swartz (1998) is also making a link between such practices and the 
articulation of a position of “anti-psychiatric” resistance. 
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There are some further points to be made about the ambiguous positioning of mental 
health professionals in relation to indigenous healing in the context of professionalist 
discourse, and the strong imperative to be simultaneously non-discriminatory and 
culturally sensitive in practice. Much of the talk of the mental health professionals 
reflects an uneasy negotiation between a number of subject positions. On the one hand, in 
recommending caution or greater control in working with indigenous healing, these 
professionals (and the psychiatrist in particular) could be positioned as obstructive and 
non-progressive traditionalists; patently racist; the “veterinary psychiatrists” (L. Swartz, 
1991: 242) demonised in anti-psychiatric arguments; or in a related way, disrespectful of 
African culture and insensitive to cultural difference. On the other hand, as I have 
discussed at length, unduly favourable talk about indigenous healing or deviation from 
psychiatric discourse may position these practitioners as irrational or eccentric, and 
therefore unprofessional and incompetent. This seems a difficult balancing act, and the 
“stalemate” in the discussion around indigenous healing is perhaps understandable in this 
light.  
 
In the following, final chapter, I will discuss some of the implications of this analysis for 
the current debate on collaboration between indigenous healing and mental health. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss the implications of the foregoing analysis for the contemporary 
debate on indigenous healing, and address certain reflexive issues and limitations of the 
study. As I have argued, despite the construction of cogent commendations for the 
inclusion of indigenous healing in mental health, it remains largely marginalised within 
talk about mental health practice. Admittedly, this study reproduces this marginalisation 
through the scarcity of analytical comments which address indigenous healing discourse, 
and particularly the interview with the indigenous healer. This interview proceeded in a 
manner which was in certain respects largely unanticipated, and was difficult to include 
in the main part of the analysis, for reasons I discuss below. It foregrounds specific 
problems of language difference and discourse analytic methodology, and I will reflect 
on these in the course of this discussion. 
 
 
5.1. “OTHERING” AND LANGUAGE DIFFERENCE 
 
Psychologist [53]: . . . I’ve just come to the conclusion that what we do is completely 
different you know . . . . We seem to be such a vast um difference. 
 
Mental health professionals’ construction of indigenous healing, and the corresponding 
“African mind” or psychology it supposedly addresses, as fundamentally different, 
produces problematic effects. As I have argued in the analysis, this construction of 
difference is largely determined by psychological and psychiatric discourses of “African 
minds” and African culture that, similarly to the production of colonial knowledge, are 
produced in relation to the “West”, and in terms of how they differ from the “West” 
(Mills, 1997). These colonial discourses are strikingly reproduced in the talk of the 
mental health professionals who participated in this study. In colonial accounts Africans 
are constructed not as individuals, but in terms of an undifferentiated, homogeneous 
mass, existing on a different time scale (exemplified in notions of primitivity) (Mills, 
 81 
1997). In addition, the language of “stress” and coping encountered in conceptualisations 
of Mr X’s affliction (as the result of “cultural stressors”) contributes to the construction 
of the “African mind”, as an object of psychological knowledge, as essentially fragile and 
vulnerable to social change, and in this sense different to the “western mind”. Lastly, the 
rationalist underpinnings of mental health practice serve further to position African 
indigenous healing as a contradictory or negative discourse in relation to rational, 
empirical “western” psychiatry. 
 
Understanding indigenous healing and the cultural forms it draws from and sustains 
would be immeasurably assisted by fluency in the language that constructs them. The 
construction of difference is exacerbated by the obvious difficulties posed by the majority 
of mental health professionals’ inability to speak any African languages. As a 
commentary on the interviews as a whole, the absence of any reference to this issue in 
participants’ talk, matching that in the indigenous healing literature, is striking. 
Collaboration with indigenous healing is advanced as a panacea for the “cultural 
inappropriateness” of mental health care for African patients. However, the undue focus 
on “cultural differences” as the reason behind the ineffectiveness of “western” 
psychiatric treatment obscures a critical lack of attention to the issue of language 
difference between patient and practitioner. Adequate communication is not only 
desirable, but essential to the realisation of mental health care. As has been noted by L. 
Swartz (1989; 1996; 1998), and particularly Drennan (1999), the silence about language 
issues in South African psychiatry belies its centrality in the complex institutional and 
power dynamics that impede change and integration in daily psychiatric practice. 
Therefore, although the debate on indigenous healing may represent important moves 
toward more equitable service, any discussion pertaining to it tends to foreground and 
prioritise “cultural issues”, diverting attention away from the more immediate concern of 
being able to communicate acceptably with patients. 
 
As I have already mentioned, ironically, the marginalisation of indigenous healing is to 
some extent reproduced in this study, in its silence about the indigenous healer. I discuss 
the difficulty of analysing this encounter with the healer and offer some thoughts on its 
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significance in the following paragraphs. In providing some context I resort to interview 
extracts, as well as observations and notes about the interview process written 
immediately after the interview, and this account therefore takes a somewhat 
ethnographic form. 
 
I had initially assumed that I would be able to locate an indigenous healer who was both 
fluent in English, and had a basic familiarity with the “language” and procedures in 
psychiatric hospitals. The healer who agreed to participate in this study had had previous 
collaborative contact with the local psychiatric hospital, but did not speak English at all, 
necessitating the enlistment of an interpreter. The interpreter made the initial contact with 
the healer, briefly explaining the purpose of the study. The interview took place later in 
the healer’s “sacred hut” in which she usually consults with her “clients”. Upon 
beginning the interview, it seemed as if she had been under the impression that I had 
come for a consultation. I began to explain about the research and the vignettes, to which 
she stated that she would only comment if I had seen this patient myself so that she could 
divine the problem and its cause. It became apparent to me that she had been under the 
impression that I was from the local psychiatric hospital and that I had come to consult 
her about a patient there. After some clarification of my intentions, which unfortunately 
was not recorded on tape, the following comments were made by the healer and 
interpreter in response to my request to present her with the first vignette (Mr X)5: 
 
Healer & interpreter [54]: If this was really a case that was existing, and if er the patient was 
around, and they would bring that patient I would look at that case, and see what’s bothering 
the person, because that’s one other way that I’m really using, to look at the patient and see 
what’s wrong with the patient /hmm/. [long pause] # If you had seen this person, then we 
would be able to look into that person, and tell you without seeing the person that this is 
happening, this is what is happening with this patient, and because you have seen how the 
person looks, how the person reacts, how the person is, then you would be able to say ja, I’ve 
seen these things so you are right, but unfortunately that’s not the case /ja/. # Ja because it’s 
easy to tell what is happening with the person, the person that is sick, especially when you 
have seen that person, so that you could agree and say, this is the case, if it’s not then it’s not. 
But if you have not seen then it’s difficult. Actually I could look into it, but unfortunately you 
wouldn’t be able to say if that’s the case or not, because you haven’t seen the person /ja/. 
 
                                                                 
5 Note that the hashes (#) in the extracts refer to instances of conversation between the healer and the interpreter in 
Xhosa, and these were neither transcribed, nor translated directly. 
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In this extract [54], the healer expresses an initial reluctance to engage with the case 
vignette, since if Mr X is not “real”, I will not be able to corroborate her utterances. This 
is a significant aspect of the ukuvumisa (literally, “to agree”) divination “method”, in 
which a relative consults the healer in the absence of the person in question, and must 
agree or disagree with the explanations offered by the healer (Hirst, 1993). 
 
To navigate this miscommunication, I then moved on to other parts of the interview and 
only later returned to the vignette. Imagining that she might also be anxious that my 
intention was to test or evaluate her, I explained that I was only interested in hearing her 
opinions about Mr X. She subsequently agreed to hear the vignette. In the following 
extract, the healer offers some comments on the case vignette of Mr X: 
 
Healer & interpreter [55]: # Ja what usually happens is as you were saying that in this case 
this person is . . . crying, you wouldn’t say the person has something wrong with the heart, 
which is what the doctors usually say, but we think that what happens is that, that person has 
what they call is um . . . that person has a guilty conscience sometimes, and it comes up and 
talks, and it comes from the heart, because when one does something wrong, or when 
something is wrong with that person, it comes from the heart and it goes up to the mind 
/hmm/. So it’s not really the heart that’s wrong, which in many cases doctors say, this person 
has a heart problem. 
 
JY [56]: And would you have a name for what’s wrong with this person, is there a name for 
it? 
 
Healer & interpreter [57]: # The . . . I’m trying to get the right word for umbilini, cos I can 
feel that (we’re not really saying) [ ] /nerves?/ but I think it’s when you feel like you . . . you 
know, I think it’s nervous system that goes wrong, it’s like you have nerves you know, ja. 
And then she says this nervous illness that we have, doesn’t stay as it is. But what happens is 
that it becomes wind inside /umoya?/ Ja umoya. # Then it’s the stomach /ja/. Ja. Then it’s the 
stomach that has a problem, so that problem is in the stomach /ok, ja/. # Then it goes to his 
head, # then his head you know it’s like, it gets puzzled, as if there’s something wrong, # 
then when that person is thinking, he cannot say clearly what am I thinking, because 
something’s wrong with the head, # it’s the . . . I think the . . . what is this . . . it’s the nerves 
really, it’s the . . . the nervous system that really gets tight and gets painful, ja. # Then it 
makes that person, as we can look into it, we say as blacks (amaXhosa), that he can get 
scared of something that he doesn’t see, he gets scared of what is not there /hmm/, because of 
the system, the nervous system that is painful then that’s making him think wrong /hmm/, it’s 
puzzling him. # Then from the head it goes and stay here at the back [points to back of his 
head and neck]. Actually what she’s saying is what is happening with that person, the actual 
patient that you are talking about /hmm/, she says that’s what is happening with the patient. # 
The blacks (amaXhosa) would say # she has something between the . . . at the back, just at 
the centre of the back, and it comes up in front /hmm/, and then she would feel like 
something is sticking her inside /hmm/. # Ja this is what is happening it’s like a feeling 
because the patient dreams of these things, and the patient sees these things, although no-one 
else can see them, so that’s what really happens with this patient, he sees the wrong things 
that are not there, but only he can see them /hmm/. # When your blood is light in Xhosa I 
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mean it’s like you . . . you have not done all the rituals you have done [or] must have done, so 
your blood is light. # If your family would have liked to make ligqira, # everything is just 
here for you, actually everything is . . . nothing is hidden, nothing gets hidden from you, in 
other words, it’s easy for you to see things that are not seen by other people /oh . . . oh/. # 
And then it makes you . . . it makes things [ ] in your mind, because your mind is full up with 
other things that other people cannot see /hmm/. 
 
The interpreter was not involved in the transcription of the interview, and I was unable to 
discuss with him in much detail his own impressions of how the interview had proceeded. 
As a result, a consideration of the subtleties of translation between Xhosa and English, 
although complex and important, has been omitted. I am unable to determine, for 
example, exactly how the interpreter described the research objectives to the healer, or 
whether he found it difficult to translate the healer’s divinations into English. The above 
exchange represents a complex and elusive text which is to some extent difficult to 
analyse discursively, firstly, without having re-translated the audio-tapes before 
transcribing them, and secondly, without fluency in Xhosa or some awareness of the 
extract’s cultural or historical connotations. As a study by Hirst (1993) suggests, the 
meanings of utterances in a Xhosa ukuvumisa divination are not easily translatable into 
English. 
 
It is interesting however, to note that in the above extract [57], while talking about Mr X, 
the healer began to experience the somatic manifestations of umbilini in her own body, 
and to speak of Mr X as a “real” person. The healer’s experiencing first-hand of a 
person’s affliction is a common characteristic of healers’ divinations (Hirst, 1993). The 
significance of the apparently involuntary conflation of the fictional case vignette with a 
real person is difficult to interpret without further contextual knowledge. However, in 
reading this extract it is possible to speak, rather simplistically, of an indigenous healing 
discourse that constructs umbilini as an affliction experienced in a primarily somatic 
mode, which is caused by neglect of required rituals. 
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5.1.1. Positioning in the interview 
 
I will discuss here the possible ways in which both myself and the healer were positioned 
in this interview. 
 
Healer & interpreter [58]: # There’s no difference as such. # As long as they are going to give 
enough space to do what you want to do, # not unless it’s a person that can um . . . a person 
that can’t move /ja/, then you could go and see that person even if he [ ]. # Cos we blacks 
(amaXhosa) we usually do that when the person cannot move, then they usually come and 
take you so that you could go to where the person is, and do a vumisa, er in that place. 
 
Healer & interpreter [59]: # Ja she’s heard that there [healer laughs and speaks] are patients, 
people that have come to see her, so she’s been panicking all the time /oh/ [healer laughs and 
speaks] [ ] . . . and they’ve come to see her /oh/ ja because she always sees when one is 
coming. She could feel it in her body that a certain person is coming /oh/ with this problem, 
but now she’s been keeping things up until we finish /oh/, and she says for the time that 
we’ve taken she’s really been, not been herself most of the time, because she’s been feeling 
that she must have been doing something else /oh/ and she thinks that it will be fifty rands. # 
This is painful in you, as one who is asking all these things you know, when you ask of a 
certain case, then you sort of transfer yourself in that case, so you feel all those things /hmm/, 
so that’s why it’s painful. 
 
Although, as I have stated, I was largely unable to determine how the interpreter had 
translated both the healer’s and my words, I was able to discern in my transcription of the 
first extract [58] above that the interpreter had translated amaXhosa (literally “the Xhosa 
people”) as “we blacks”. While the healer’s use of the term “amaXhosa” constructs a 
difference between us based on an “ethnic” identity, the translation as it stands constructs 
us as racially different. I am consequently positioned in this extract as an outsider to the 
knowledge of indigenous healing that all “blacks” share. 
 
The second extract [59] is part of what was relayed to me as I was ending the interview, 
in response to the question of how much our consultation would cost. It contains two 
features that are of interest. First, the bodily sensations and experiences that announced 
the arrival of new “clients” are constructed here as involuntary and as something inflicted 
upon her from an outside source. Second, in reflecting on this extract, I am aware of 
being positioned as having wasted her time, keeping her from the more immediate and 
pressing concerns of healing people, and as having caused her unnecessary pain for a 
frivolous cause. 
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Significantly, the translation in both of these extracts [58, 59] positions the interpreter as 
part of, and insider to the knowledge of indigenous healing, evident in the shifting of 
pronouns in the last sentence of the second extract (“she” becomes “you”, to refer to 
himself). Both of these extracts demonstrate how the power of an interviewer may be 
subverted, in the Foucauldian sense, and how power operates in unpredictable ways in 
interviews (Ribbens, 1989). 
 
Although the indigenous healer’s response to my request to present the vignette to her 
may largely have been due to a misunderstanding stemming from the complications of 
translation, it also alludes to resistance on the part of the healer to being positioned 
through this exchange as a compliant research participant. My impression that she 
thought that I had come from the local psychiatric hospital to consult her about a patient 
is perhaps significant. If this is accurate, I was a representative to her of two powerful 
institutions, that of the university and of psychiatry (the interpreter had introduced me as 
a psychology student doing research), and I had approached her, despite all intentions to 
the contrary, in these terms. In addition, the significance of the usage of “we blacks” in 
my positioning as an “outsider” suggests an association of the power of psychiatry with 
“race”, and a resistance to it based on “blackness”. 
 
In terms of analysing the text, in being unable to speak the language of the indigenous 
healer, I could approach the text only as an “outsider”, and the associations and 
connotations of the text that Parker and Burman (1993) suggest are important to the 
analysis were not immediately available to me. As Parker, Levett, Kottler and Burman 
(1997: 200) have observed, the fact that discourse analysis in South Africa is employed 
almost exclusively in the medium of English represents a serious obstacle to engagement 
with the workings of culture and power, since such an endeavour demands attention to 
the “variety of linguistic resources that people draw upon to make sense of themselves 
and others”. Although it is possible to produce discursive analyses of translated texts, the 
social, historical and cultural allusions in these discourses may be harder to elaborate.  
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Particularly in 
 
communities with a colonial history . . . where part of the resistance is a pride 
in local languages and categories of identity . . . the complexities of 
experience are not readily tapped through direct questioning or interviews 
translated into English or other European languages associated with 
modernity systems of knowledge (Levett, Kottler, Walaza, Mabena, Leon & 
Ngqakayi-Motaung, 1997: 126). 
 
There is an extent to which the healer’s response was difficult to anticipate in the design 
of the study. As I mentioned previously, in spite of efforts to ensure the content of the 
vignette was as accessible as possible to the healer, it seems the vignette itself, as a form 
of text, was not immediately accessible for the healer to interpret. And, the hindrance of 
both my inability to speak Xhosa, and my feeling of having intruded kept me from 
exploring further the healer’s thoughts about the interview process. 
 
 
5.2. VALIDITY 
 
In this section, I discuss issues related to validity, beginning with an attempt to account 
for the way my perspective as researcher may have influenced the conception and design 
of the research, the data collected, and the interpretations reached in it. I want to 
emphasise that the reading produced in this dissertation is my response to the interview 
texts, and that the discourses I have identified are constructions in themselves. This is 
not, in any sense, a confession of flawed objectivity, but a reflexive engagement with the 
various subjectivities implicated in the research process (Hollway, 1989). 
 
 
5.2.1. Conception, design and interpretation 
 
First, my choice of a critical discourse analytic approach for the study of collaboration 
with indigenous healing was motivated by my experiences as a “psychologist-in-
training”. I have been confronted on numerous occasions in my practical training in 
psychiatric or medical institutions by professionals’ power to define people’s identities. 
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These experiences have brought me into contact with the contradictions inherent in both 
the desire to “help”, and how this “help” may lock people who receive it into disciplinary 
psychological apparatuses that reproduce oppressive power relations. I am aware, in 
many cases, of having reproduced in my own reports and presentations for case 
conferences, discourses that have potentially individualising or even racist effects (e.g. in 
my case conceptualisations). These issues are intensified by the intertwining of the 
imperative to “help”, with the requirements of training, in which disciplinary/institutional 
progress is evaluated in terms of one’s ability to apply psychological discourses to both 
“patients” and to oneself (cf. S. Swartz, 1999). Within the institutions in which I have 
been trained and evaluated, I have been aware of being positioned, both as a trainee and 
as a patient in psychotherapy, in ways that made it difficult for me to define or 
understand myself in alternative ways. 
 
As a result, in producing this study I am aligning myself with attempts at articulating 
instances of resistance to the power of psychology and psychiatry as dividing practices to 
produce pathological “cultural” (or “racial”) identities. As a result, my “alienation” 
within indigenous healing discourse was ironic. The production of knowledge about 
“race” and culture in South African psychiatry both informs and is fed by developments 
in a larger, socio-political context. In my meagre experience as a practitioner, I have been 
sympathetic to the dilemmas posed by this “larger context” amidst the daily necessity to 
perform interventions that directly affect the lives of people. Suspicious of comfortable 
and apparently morally compelling formulations to respect cultural differences, or to be 
non-discriminatory, I have sought to produce an account that highlights the new 
dilemmas for practice thrown up by cultural-political developments, in the context of 
indigenous healing. 
 
 
5.2.2. The participants 
 
In this section I attempt to outline some points arising from a consideration of the 
interviews as texts which were co-constructed between myself and the participants, and 
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in particular, my positioning in these texts in relation to the participants (cf. Hollway, 
1989). Although I am unable to substantiate the following comments with reference to 
specific interview material, I will briefly outline my impressions of some of the ways I 
was positioned in these interviews. In the interactions with the mental health 
professionals, I was positioned as: a “westerner” (who shared the practitioners’ culture 
and values); as a colleague (who shared and understood the difficulties of psychiatric 
practice); and as a naï ve and inexperienced trainee (who needed to be warned about the 
dangers of being overly idealistic). In the interview with the healer/anthropologist, I was 
acutely aware of being positioned primarily as a psychologist, who would be scrutinising 
her words for evidence of pathology, occasioning, on her part, talk about indigenous 
healing that incorporated notions from psychological discourse, and talk which explained 
and justified indigenous healing concepts in a rational way. As I have argued, this 
rendered her talk “manageable” in an academic register in a way that the healer’s talk 
was not. Lastly, as I have mentioned above, I seem to have been positioned in the 
interview with the healer and interpreter as an “outsider”, as both “racially” different (and 
therefore ignorant) and as sceptical psychiatric professional or student (who would be 
scrutinising her practice in order to discredit it). In reflecting on my positioning, I present 
here an excerpt from the notes I wrote immediately following the interview with the 
indigenous healer: 
 
Tough going. Felt that I had somehow behaved inappropriately, and invaded without respect, 
a world whose significance and power I didn’t know how to interact with, or acknowledge. 
Felt that I had somehow offended this woman, who was more interested in doing, and 
healing, than talking, speculating, or offering opinions (although, as I said before, she could 
have been inhibited for other reasons). Felt like a blundering oaf. Frustrating that I couldn’t 
speak the language, stilted the interview. Felt lost, as if I were missing the keys to the proper 
approach, that I could in fact offend without being aware. 
 
As a reflection on the interview, this account attests to my positioning as an ignorant 
“buffoon”. In it, I am positioned as an outsider to a separate world whose rules I have 
inadvertently transgressed, producing the required emotional response of guilt. Numerous 
(particularly feminist) researchers have written about the difficulties of research with 
participants who are “other” to the researcher, “racially” or otherwise (e.g. Edwards, 
1996; Russell, 1996; De la Rey, 1997). These authors foreground the politics of 
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“representing the other” and importantly, deconstruct the notion that researchers and 
participants must be as similar as possible in order to produce valid research, provided 
that the effects of difference are engaged with. 
 
My positioning in relation to the participants reflects the flexibility of power relations, 
which may shift unexpectedly in interviews (Ribbens, 1989). For although I occupied an 
ostensibly powerful position as a representative of “white” psychiatry/academia in the 
interview with the healer and interpreter, I found myself positioned as ignorant, different, 
and ultimately without power. This is consistent with a Foucauldian conception of power, 
in which “power is not conceived of as a unidimensional quality that is possessed or 
lacked” (Banister et al., 1994: 68), but as shifting between varying positions within the 
possibilities provided in discourse. 
 
 
5.2.3. Validation, accountability and ethics 
 
Kvale (1996) refers to three “communities of validation”, to which qualitative research 
studies may be accountable, namely the participants, the general public and the 
theoretical or research community. Ethical principles held by new paradigm qualitative 
research approaches (e.g. feminist and “participatory” research) generally emphasise 
accountability to participants, and consequently, research “results” – as truths emergent 
from a particular context – are usually fed back to participants in attempts to include 
them in the final production of knowledge (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994). While this study 
could have been improved by an exchange of readings and reactions between myself and 
the participants, this would not be conducted with the aim of getting to participants’ 
“true” meanings, as it is perhaps in more “realist” approaches (e.g. phenomenological or 
ethnographic studies). Discursive studies, such as the present one, will produce 
interpretations that are suspicious of, and potentially hostile to participants’ meanings 
(Parker, 1992), and in this sense, their validity and accountability do not depend on 
“being true” to these meanings. At the same time, my power as analyst to impose 
meaning on other people’s words must also be acknowledged, and I emphasise that the 
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reading produced in this study is one of a number of possible readings (Parker & Burman, 
1993). While this acknowledgement does not invalidate the study, it does point to the 
importance of accounting for the reasons that may have led me to privilege certain 
interpretations over others, as I have attempted in the reflexive analysis above (Banister 
et al., 1994). 
 
Since the primary “community of validation” at which this study is aimed is a 
predominantly academic and professional audience, its validity must be evaluated 
according to the body of meta-theory and methodological paradigm that informs it 
(Kvale, 1996). 
 
 
5.3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The production of knowledge concerning African culture in psychiatry is usually seen as 
an expression of benign motives aimed at improving understanding of other cultures, 
appreciating difference, and thereby optimising care. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) 
point out, culture-talk (as opposed to talk about “race”) positions those who engage in it 
as tolerant, open-minded, appreciative of diversity, and progressive. However, as I have 
arguably demonstrated, psychiatric discourses on culture focus implicitly on the “black” 
(and not “white”) patient, and reinforce constructions of difference and “otherness”. 
Thus, although attention to “cultural issues” in mental health is ostensibly motivated by 
liberal values of equal access and fairness, the individualising effects of psychiatric 
practice and some forms of psychological discourse promote a “culturalism” that plays a 
part in the surveillance function of the state (Foster & S. Swartz, 1997; Parker et al., 
1995). However, psychological knowledges produced about the “African mind” and 
indigenous healing may function in contradictory ways to both extend the surveillance of 
the discipline (cf. Butchart, 1997), and as a platform for resistance to psychiatric power, 
for example, in psychological notions framing “cultural illness” as treatable by 
“containment”, versus constructions of “cultural illness” as amenable only to indigenous 
healing interventions. As I have argued in this study, despite constructions of the power 
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of scientifically validated psychiatry as universal, in the treatment of Africans, this power 
is disavowed. In this regard, psychiatry is constructed as fundamentally ineffective in 
treating certain “African afflictions” or in providing therapeutic “illness narratives” for 
Africans, while indigenous healing methods are constructed as pre-eminently suitable for 
these afflictions (notably “cultural illness” and for example, ukuthwasa) and can act upon 
Africans in ways that “western” psychiatry cannot. 
 
This brief study has highlighted the ways in which the interests and power/knowledge 
struggles between the psychiatric and psychological professions are implicated in the 
issue of collaborating with indigenous healing. The all-encompassing and persuasive 
inclusivist rhetoric characteristic of the literature on indigenous healing, and reproduced 
here in the talk of the participants, obscures the fault lines dividing domains of expertise 
both within mental health (between psychiatrists and psychologists) and between mental 
health and indigenous healing. The prominence of “professionalist discourse” in the talk 
of the mental health professionals is an indication of the way the debate on collaboration 
serves to show up professional interests, and the policing of domains of expertise, to 
which indigenous healing presents a potential challenge.  
 
Furthermore, while this study reproduces to some extent the marginalisation of 
indigenous healing discourse, it has also examined some of the discursive practices and 
methodological difficulties implicated in its marginalisation. It is nevertheless possible to 
glean, from my brief analysis, the following points about indigenous healing discourse. In 
the context of “cultural pride strategies” associated with talk about an African 
Renaissance (and initiatives to preserve “indigenous knowledge”: cf. Wynberg, 1998), 
indigenous healing can function as a site of assertion of African power and resistance in 
both mental health professionals’ and indigenous healers’ constructions of it as an 
essentially African enterprise (cf. L. Swartz, 1996). At the same time, it may also achieve 
disciplinary effects consonant with cultural pride strategies, in constructing afflictions in 
terms of neglect of, or disloyalty to, cultural tradition. Despite its marginalisation in 
modernity mental health, indigenous healing may function as a dominant discourse in 
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relation to other discourses defined in opposition to it (cf. Parker, 1992), producing 
effects which may also be potentially oppressive. 
 
Finally, I have focused in this study on the constructions of culture and “pathology” in 
material from different sources (the different practitioners), and attempted to explore the 
implications of these constructions for the power relations between mental health and 
indigenous healing discourses. The study has highlighted two important issues for the 
current debate on indigenous healing. First, without knowledge of the language in which 
indigenous healers and Africans construct indigenous healing, it will be difficult to 
articulate indigenous healing discourse in a way that challenges the dominant psychiatric 
discourses implicated in its marginalisation within mental health. Second, a more detailed 
exposition of the disciplinary apparatuses of indigenous healing discourse in itself, and 
their operation in South African society would be important. The experience of 
conducting this research has led me to conclude that, while a discourse analytic approach 
is crucial to unpacking modernity discourses about “African culture” or tradition, the 
conspicuous lack of attention to discourse analysis in languages other than English 
represents a significant obstacle to developing critical accounts of the processes of culture 
and power in a heterogeneous South African society. 
 
 94 
REFERENCES 
 
 
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (4th Ed). Washington: APA Press. 
 
Appiah, K. A. (1995). African identities. In L. Nicholson & S. Seidman (Eds.), Social 
postmodernism: Beyond identity politics. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, UK. 
 
Baleta, A. (1998). South Africa to bring traditional healers into mainstream medicine. 
Lancet, 352, 554. 
 
Banister, P., Burman, E., Parker, I., Taylor, M. & Tindall, C. (1994). Qualitative 
methods in psychology: A research guide. Buckingham: Open University 
Press. 
 
Bantjes, M. (1999). Translation in clinical practice: A hermeneutic inquiry. 
Unpublished honours thesis, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. 
 
Bibeau, G. (1997). Cultural psychiatry in a creolising world: Questions for a new 
research agenda. Transcultural Psychiatry, 34, 9-41. 
 
Biesheuvel, S. (!987). Cross-cultural psychology: it’s relevance to South Africa. In K. 
F. Mauer & A. I. Retief, Psychology in context: Cross-cultural research 
trends in South Africa. Pretoria: HSRC. 
 
Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D. & Radley, A. (1988). 
Ideological dilemmas: A social psychology of everyday thinking. London: 
Sage. 
 
Bodibe, C. & Sodi, T. (1997). Indigenous healing. In D. Foster, M. Freeman & Y. 
Pillay, Mental Health Policy Issues for South Africa. Pinelands: MASA 
Multimedia Publications. 
 
Brown, L. (1997). A discursive analysis of the role of tertiary educational institutions 
in reproducing racism.  Unpublished Master’s dissertation, University of 
Natal. 
 
Butchart, A. (1997). Objects without origins: Foucault in South African socio-medical 
science. South African Journal of Psychology, 27, 101-110. 
 
Casement, P. (1984). On learning from the patient. London: Routledge. 
 
Coughlan, F. J. (1995). Primary health care organizations in South Africa: Some 
conceptual issues. South African Journal of Sociology, 26, 9-14. 
 95 
Dawes, A. R. L. (1986). The notion of relevant psychology with particular reference 
to Africanist pragmatic initiatives. Psychology in Society,  5, 28-48. 
 
Dawes, A. R. L. (1996). Africanisation of psychology. Paper presented to the 2nd 
Annual Congress of the Psychological Society of South Africa, University of 
the Witwatersrand, September 1996. 
 
De la Rey, C. (1997). On political activism and discourse analysis in South Africa. In 
A. Levett, A. Kottler, E. Burman & I. Parker (Eds.), Culture, power, and 
difference: Discourse analysis in South Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press. 
 
Department of Health (1997). White paper for the transformation of the health system 
in South Africa. Available: 
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/health.html. 
 
Dickinson, G. (1999). Traditional healers face off with science. Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, 160, 629-630. 
 
Drennan, G. (1999). Psychiatry, post-apartheid integration and the neglected role of 
language in South African institutional contexts. Transcultural Psychiatry, 36, 
5-22. 
 
Eagle, G. T., Frenkel, L., Green, J. & Wolman, W. L. (1991, January). Mental health 
issues in relation to South African Women. Paper presented at the Women and 
Gender in South Africa conference, University of Natal, Durban. 
 
Edwards, S. D. (1986). Traditional and modern medicine in South Africa: A research 
study. Social Science and Medicine, 22, 127-132. 
 
Edwards, R. (1996). White woman researcher –  black women subjects. In S. 
Wilkinson & C. Kitzinger (Eds.), Representing the Other. A Feminism & 
Psychology Reader. London: Sage. 
 
Ensink, K. & Robertson, B. (1996). Indigenous categories of distress and dysfunction 
in South African Xhosa children and adolescents as described by indigenous 
healers. Transcultural Psychiatric Research Review, 33, 137-173. 
 
Ensink, K. & Robertson, B. (1999). Patient and family experiences of psychiatric 
services and African indigenous healers. Transcultural Psychiatry, 36, 23-43. 
 
Evans, J. & Singh, P. (1991). Muti murders: ritual responses to stress. Indicator South 
Africa, 8, 46-48. 
 
Foster, D. & Swartz, S. (1997). Introduction: Policy considerations. In D. Foster, M. 
Freeman & Y. Pillay, Mental Health Policy Issues for South Africa. Pinelands: 
MASA Multimedia Publications. 
 
Freeman, M. (1988). Mental health in Zimbabwe: Are there lessons for South Africa? 
Psychology in Society, 9, 22-43. 
 96 
Gillis, L. S., Koch, A. & Joyi, M. (1989). Improving compliance in Xhosa psychiatric 
patients. South African Medical Journal, 76, 205-208. 
 
Good, B. J. (1994). Medicine, rationality and experience: An anthropological 
perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Good, B. J. & DelVecchio Good, M. J. (1980). The meaning of symptoms: A cultural 
hermeneutic model for clinical practice. In L. Eisenberg and A. Kleinman 
(Eds.), The relevance of social science for medicine. D. Reidel Publishing. 
 
Green, E. C. (1994). AIDS and STDs in Africa: Bridging the gap between traditional 
healing and modern medicine. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press. 
 
Grof, S. & Grof, C. (Eds.) (1989). Spiritual emergency: When personal 
transformation becomes a crisis. Los Angeles: Tarcher. 
 
Hall, S. (1996). Introduction: Who needs ‘identity’? In S. Hall & P. du Gay (Eds.), 
Questions of cultural identity. Sage: London. 
 
Henwood, K. & Pidgeon, N. (1994). Beyond the qualitative paradigm: A framework 
for introducing diversity within qualitative psychology. Journal of Community 
and Applied Social Psychology, 4, 225-238. 
 
Herbst, D. & Britz, P. D. S. (1986). Die toordokter as personeelkonsultant: ‘n 
Gevallestudie.  Pretoria: Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing. 
 
Hess, S. (1998). Swopping stethoscopes for bones. Weekly Mail & Guardian 
Archives, 24 December 1998. Available: 
http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/981224/NEWS24.html. 
 
Hickson, J., Christie, G., and Shmukler, D. (1990). A pilot study of world view of 
black and white South African adolescent pupils: Implications for cross-
cultural counselling. South African Journal of Psychology, 20, 170-177. 
 
Hirst, M. (1990). The healer’s art: Cape Nguni diviners in the townships of 
Grahamstown. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Rhodes University. 
 
Hirst, M. (1993). The healer’s art: Cape Nguni diviners in the townships of 
Grahamstown, Eastern Cape, South Africa. Curare, 16, 97-114. 
 
Hirst, M., Cook, J. & Kahn, M. (1996). Shades, witches and somatisation in the 
narratives of illness and disorder among the Cape Nguni in the Eastern Cape, 
South Africa. Curare, 19, 255-282. 
 
Hollway, W. (1989). Subjectivity and method in psychology: Gender, meaning and 
science. London: Sage. 
 
Hopa, M., Simbayi, L. C. & du Toit, C. D. (1998). Perceptions on integration of 
traditional and western healing in the new South Africa. South African Journal 
of Psychology, 28, 8-14. 
 97 
Kanneh, K. (1998). African identities: Race, nation and culture in ethnography, Pan-
Africanism and black literatures. London: Routledge. 
 
Kleinman, A. (1988). Rethinking psychiatry: From cultural category to personal 
experience. New York: Free Press. 
 
Koch, E. (1997). A Zulu renaissance could bring peace. Daily Mail & Guardian 
Archives, 23 July 1997. Available: 
http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97jul2/23jul-kwazulu.html. 
 
Korber, I. (1990). Indigenous healers in a future mental health system: A case for co-
operation. Psychology in Society, 14, 47-62. 
 
Kottler, A. (1988). Professionalisation of African healers: Apparent problems and 
constraints. Psychology in Society, 11, 2-17. 
 
Kottler, A. (1990). South Africa: Psychology’s dilemma of multiple discourses. 
Psychology in Society, 13, 27-36. 
 
Kottler, A. (1996). Voices in the winds of change. In S. Wilkinson & C. Kitzinger 
(Eds.), Representing the Other. A Feminism & Psychology Reader. London: 
Sage. 
 
Kvale, S. (1996). InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
 
Levett, A., Kottler, A., Burman, E. & Parker, I. (1997). Power and discourse: culture 
and change in South Africa. In A. Levett, A. Kottler, E. Burman & I. Parker 
(Eds.), Culture, power, and difference: Discourse analysis in South Africa. 
Cape Town: UCT Press.   
 
Levett, A., Kottler, A., Walaza, N., Mabena, P., Leon, N. & Ngqakayi-Motaung, N. 
(1997). Pieces of mind: traumatic effects of child sexual abuse amongst black 
South African women. In A. Levett, A. Kottler, E. Burman & I. Parker (Eds.), 
Culture, power, and difference: Discourse analysis in South Africa. Cape 
Town: UCT Press. 
 
Littlewood, R. (1997). Agency and its vicissitudes: The pathologies of the future. 
Transcultural Psychiatry, 34, 78-90. 
 
Long, C. & Zietkiewicz, E. (1999, September). Unsettling meanings of madness: 
Constructions of South African Insanity. Paper presented at the 5th Annual 
Qualitative Methods Conference. University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. 
 
Lonner, W. J. and Malpass, R. S. (Eds) (1994). Psychology and culture. Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon. 
 
Louw, J. (1988). Professionalisation as a moral concern. Psychology in Society, 9, 66-
80. 
 98 
Lucas, R. H. & Barrett, R. (1995). Interpreting culture and psychopathology: 
Primitivist themes in cross-cultural debate. Culture, Medicine & Psychiatry, 
19, 287-326. 
 
Malan, D. H. (1979). Individual psychotherapy and the science of psychodynamics. 
Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Mangcu, X. (1998). Seeking common national values. Weekly Mail & Guardian 
Archives, 5 June 1998. Available: 
http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/980605/NEWS31.html. 
 
Mills, S. (1997). Discourse. London: Routledge. 
 
Mkize, D. L. (1998). Amafufunyana - is it a culture-bound syndrome? South African 
Medical Journal, 88, 329-331. 
 
Mogale, C. C. (1999). ‘Moriti wa letswele’ (the shadow of the breast) – a stress-
related Somatoform Pain Disorder. South African Journal of Psychology, 29, 
72-75. 
 
Ngubane, H. (1977). Body and mind in Zulu medicine: An ethnography of health and 
disease in Nyuswa-Zulu thought and practice. London: Academic Press. 
 
Ogden, T. H. (1986). The matrix of the mind: Object relations and the psychoanalytic 
dialogue. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson. 
 
Parker, I. (1992). Discourse dynamics: Critical analysis for social and individual 
psychology. London: Routledge. 
 
Parker, I. & Burman, E. (1993). Against discursive imperialism, empiricism and 
constructionism: thirty-two problems with discourse analysis. In E. Burman 
and I. Parker (Eds.), Discourse analytic research: Repertoires and readings of 
texts in action. London: Routledge. 
 
Parker, I. (1997). Psychological discourse in the New South Africa. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
Parker, I., Georgaca, E., Harper, D., McLaughlin, T. & Stowell-Smith, M. (1995). 
Deconstructing psychopathology. London: Sage. 
 
Parker, I., Levett, A., Kottler, A. & Burman, E. (1997). On discourse, power, culture 
and change. In A. Levett, A. Kottler, E. Burman & I. Parker (Eds.), Culture, 
power, and difference: Discourse analysis in South Africa. Cape Town: UCT 
Press. 
 
Peltzer, K. (1998). A community survey of traditional healers in South Africa 
(Northern Province). South African Journal of Ethnology, 21, 191-197. 
 
 99 
Reynolds, J. & Swartz, L. (1993). Professional constructions of a ‘lay’ illness: 
‘Nerves’ in a rural ‘coloured’ community. Social Science and Medicine, 36, 
657-663. 
 
Ribbens, J. (1989). Interviewing – an “unnatural situation”? Women’s Studies 
International Forum, 12, 579-592. 
 
Rogers, C. (1961). On becoming a person. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Rose, N. (1994). Medicine, history and the present. In C. Jones & R. Porter (Eds.), 
Reassessing Foucault: Power, medicine and the body. London: Routledge. 
 
Russell, D. E. H. (1996). Between a rock and a hard place: the politics of white 
feminists conducting research on black women in South Africa. In S. 
Wilkinson & C. Kitzinger (Eds.), Representing the Other. A Feminism & 
Psychology Reader. London: Sage. 
 
Schweitzer, R. D. (1977). Categories of experience amongst the Xhosa: A 
psychological study. Unpublished Master’s dissertation, Rhodes University.  
 
Showalter, E. (1987). The female malady: Women, madness and English culture. 
London: Virago. 
 
Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural psychology - what is it? In J.W. Stigler, R. A. 
Shweder & G. Herdt (Eds.). Cultural psychology: Essays on comparative 
human development. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Straker, G. (1994). Integrating African and western healing practices in South Africa. 
American Journal of Psychotherapy, 48, 455-467. 
 
Suryani, L. K. & Jensen, G. D. (1992). Psychiatrist, traditional healer and culture 
integrated in clinical practice in Bali. Medical Anthropology, 13, 301-314. 
 
Swartz, L. (1986). Transcultural psychiatry in South Africa. Part I. Transcultural 
Psychiatric Research Review, 23, 273-303. 
 
Swartz, L. (1987). Transcultural psychiatry in South Africa. Part II. Transcultural 
Psychiatric Research Review, 24, 5-30. 
 
Swartz, L. (1989). Aspects of culture in South African psychiatry. Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Cape Town. 
 
Swartz, L. (1991). The reproduction of racism in South African mental health care. 
South African Journal of Psychology, 21, 240-246. 
 
Swartz, L. (1996). Culture and mental health in the Rainbow Nation: Transcultural 
psychiatry in a changing South Africa. Transcultural Psychiatric Research 
Review, 33, 119-136. 
 
 100 
Swartz, L. (1998). Culture and mental health: A southern African view. Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Swartz, S. (1995). The black insane in the Cape, 1891-1920. Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 21, 399-415. 
 
Swartz, S. (1999). Using psychodynamic formulations in South African clinical 
settings. South African Journal of Psychology, 29, 42-48. 
 
Szasz, T. (1961). The myth of mental illness. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Terre Blanche, M. (1997). ‘The knowledge that one seeks to disinter’: psychiatry and 
the discourse of discourse analysis. In A. Levett, A. Kottler, E. Burman & I. 
Parker (Eds.), Culture, power, and difference: Discourse analysis in South 
Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press.   
 
Thorpe, M. R. (1982). Psychodiagnostics in a Xhosa Zionist Church. Unpublished 
Master’s dissertation, Rhodes University.  
 
Turton, R. W. (1986). Bourgeois counselling and working class clients: Some 
problems and political implications. Psychology in Society, 6, 85-100. 
 
Van Damme, H. & Maseko, N. (1997). Modern African health care: Once again on 
the road towards a non-negotiable monopoly by the modern allopathic 
biomedical cosmopolitan health system. Available: 
http://www.healthlink.org.za/hlink/info/traditio.htm. 
 
Van Schoor, W. A. (1989). Intergroup differences in student counselling: How 
prepared are we to deal with it in South Africa? International Journal for the 
Advancement of Counselling, 12, 39-48. 
 
Wetherell, M. & Potter, J. (1992). Mapping the language of racism: Discourse and 
the legitimation of exploitation. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Winnicott, D. W. (1965). The maturational processes and the facilitating 
environment: Studies in the theory of emotional development. London: 
Hogarth Press. 
 
Wittstock, B., Rozental, L. & Henn, C. (1991). Mass phenomena at a black South 
African primary school. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 42, 851-853. 
 
Wynberg, R. (1998). Indigenous knowledge at risk. Weekly Mail & Guardian 
Archives, 18 December 1998. Available: 
http://www.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/981218/NEWS51.html.  
 
 101
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW THEMES 
 
 
 
Vignette 1  
 
· How would you understand or explain what is happening to Mr X (what might your 
likely diagnosis be)? 
 
· How might Mr X’s difficulties have come about? 
 
· If you were to make up a story about this man, what other information (e.g. background, 
presentation, or anything else at all) would you think likely to be true of him? 
 
· What kind of care or treatment plan might he receive? 
 
· What problems, if any, could you foresee in dealing with this patient? 
 
· Tell me about any previous experience you have had of dealing with cases like this. 
 
 
 
Vignette 2  
 
· What are your thoughts on the proceedings/situation described here? 
 
· What do you think about the decisions that were taken for 
o Mr X to be admitted? 
o an indigenous healer to be consulted? 
 
· How might the psychologist/psychiatrist/healer have understood what is happening to 
Mr X? 
 
· In what respects might there have been disagreements 
o between the healer and other members of the team? 
o between the psychiatrist and the psychologist? 
 
· Describe how you think this situation would most likely reach a conclusion. 
 
· If you were the healer/psychologist/psychiatrist in this case, what difficulties, if any, 
would you experience in working together (with the other two) in relation to Mr X? 
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· If you were the healer/psychologist/psychiatrist in this case, what advantages, if any, 
would there be in working together (with the other two) in relation to Mr X? 
 
· In your view, what factors (if any) represent the greatest obstacles to working together? 
 
· Tell me about any experiences you’ve had in working together (with healers, 
psychologists etc.). 
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APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM 
 
 
I, ______________________________ hereby agree to participate in the proposed 
research project, subject to the following conditions: 
 
1. My participation is voluntary, and should I feel uncomfortable at any point 
during the research, I am free to discontinue my involvement, as well as request 
that any record of my participation be deleted. 
 
2. My participation is anonymous. Any identifying information will be changed or 
removed in the research report. 
 
3. The interview will be audio-taped and transcribed, according to conditions stated 
in the separate Psychology Department permission form. 
 
4. I will be given feedback on the research, and be able to read the research report, 
should I require it. 
 
 
 
 
_________________________    ________________________ 
SIGNED       DATE 
 
 
 
